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Social cognition relies on our ability to understand the mental states of others, which 
in turn depends on the ability to spontaneously access appropriate contextual information 
about the person with whom we are interacting. One well-documented index of effective 
social interaction is the capacity for mind-mindedness - whether a person represents familiar 
people, such as their best friend, as mental agents with thoughts and feelings. This thesis 
consists of three studies designed to explore the behavioural and neural correlates of mind- 
mindedness. Studies 1 and 2 investigated the hypothesis that skills important for effective 
social interaction depend on the capacity for social memory, exploring this question in terms 
of how people are categorized and how effectively social information is retrieved. Study 1 
revealed that individuals whose descriptions of their friends focused on their internal states 
had increased recognition for socially relevant cues. Study 2 links increased episodic 
memory capacity with greater levels of mind-mindedness. These results support the 
hypothesis that our capacity for social memory is an important component of mind-
mindedness. Study 3 utilised functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate 
the intrinsic organization that underpins mind-mindedness. Individual differences in mind-
mindedness were linked to a stronger decoupling between the fronto-parietal cortex and the 
posterior cingulate cortex, a pattern that meta-analytic evidence suggests is linked to 
processes such as autobiographical and episodic memory. This analysis suggests that mind-
minded representations of other people are reflected in the intrinsic organization of the 
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Towards a Component-Process Model of Mind-Mindedness 
 
1.1. Spontaneous Thought and Memory: Components of Social Cognition 
Social cognition is an essential cognitive resource in enabling humans to understand 
the world around them. It is largely dependent on the spontaneous deployment of mental 
resources towards interpreting, encoding and retrieving key elements of the complex event 
sequences that constitute everyday social interactions (Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). 
Our social-cognitive faculties undergo rapid development from an early age. During the first 
year of life, human infants acquire the behaviour of social smiling (Anisfeld, 1982), returning 
a smile when one is given. Such behaviour demonstrates the intricate interdependency 
between social and cognitive processes from an extremely early phase of life. At around ten 
months of age, children become increasingly adept at comprehending other social cues such 
as eye contact and social gaze (Beier & Spelke, 2012) and understand concepts such as deceit 
and trickery by around 2.5 years (Reddy, 2008). 
The development of the ability to understand social phenomena in this way denotes an 
increased ability in constructing robust and adaptive models of the mental states of others, or 
a representational Theory of Mind (ToM; Frith & Frith, 2005). Accordingly, our social 
cognition depends on the interaction of a number of diverse cognitive faculties in order to 
function. It requires the input of attentional faculties to enable the initial recognition of 
certain moments or actions in a complex event sequence as cues of social significance 
(Boggia & Ristic, 2015). It further requires the successful encoding of these social cues to 
memory in order to comprehend and provide an available reference for the personality, 
intentions and variance in the mental states of other people (Von Hecker, 2004).  
Our knowledge of the mental states of others is also not bound to our immediate 




mental construct of another person in the face of dynamic interactions and changing 
sequences of events (Frith & Frith, 2006a). Our ability to attend towards social cues and 
context, and predict behaviour based on recalled information from similar past interactions, 
are key components in this process (Lee & Harris, 2013). Our overall capacity for long-term 
memory is therefore an essential component of our social cognition. Our memory does not 
simply serve to store a static sequence of past events, but to provide a resource which 
interfaces with our social cognition and allows us to navigate the complex arena of social 
experience (Spreng, 2013). Although social interactions may follow common cues and 
structures, they are extremely variable events and as such can be complex in trying to predict 
(Brown & Brüne, 2012).  
There are also remarkable individual differences in our ability to successfully 
comprehend and respond to social stimuli, and some of these differences are associated with 
our ability to encode and retrieve socially-relevant information from memory in order to 
update our internal representation of the mental states of others. Ciaramelli, Bernardi, and 
Moscovitch (2013) have shown that memory for others’ past experiences can significantly 
change our level of empathy and the valence we attach to events happening to them currently. 
This suggests that individuals retrieve memories of past social interactions with an individual 
to simulate their mental state in a similar, present situation. Accordingly, the integration of 
our capacity for ToM and our memory processes allows for a system capable of attending to 
socially significant events and utilising them to update models of the internal mental states of 
others (Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006). 
Social cognition and our tendency to mentalise are also prominent features in our 
spontaneous thought. Rumination on past interactions with others is a consistent factor in the 
content of our thoughts while mind-wandering. Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, and Singer (2013) 
utilised thought-probing during the mind-wandering state combined with the technique of 




experienced spontaneous thought into their principal components. Ruby et al. (2013) found 
that a significant and recurring component of subjective thoughts experienced during the 
mind-wandering state consists of fixation on the self, fixation on past interactions with others 
and fixation on the future. These results reveal the importance of spontaneous thought as a 
component of our social cognition by allowing the automatic retrieval of socially-relevant 
information from our long-term memory stores. 
The ability to spontaneously cognise social information and rehearse the content of 
past interactions is an important foundation of our overall capacity for social cognition. 
Spreng (2013) suggests that the primary resource at our disposal in comprehending social 
phenomena is the ability to spontaneously retrieve memories of similar social situations in 
order to formulate an intuitive understanding of the wider social context and consistently 
update and adapt our mental models of individuals we interact with. Multiple studies utilising 
PCA to investigate dimensions of thought-probe responses during mind-wandering in a 
manner similar to Ruby et al. (2013) also consistently report that thinking about both past 
events and other people emerge as principal components of spontaneous thought (Medea et 
al., 2018; Poerio et al., 2017; Ruby, et al., 2013). It is unsurprising, then, that the retrieval of 
social information is prevalent in our spontaneous thought-patterns, allowing the processing 
of social cues and mental states in a manner more efficient than purely volitional memory 
retrieval. 
Accordingly, the interplay of our spontaneous cognition and our memory processes is 
a fundamental component in our ability to mentalise. Senju (2012) highlights the importance 
of spontaneous thought in a functioning social cognition. Senju noted that many autistic- 
spectrum disorder (ASD) individuals show varying degrees of impairment in processing 
social cues, with the exception of a small minority of ‘high-functioning’ ASD individuals 
who consistently show a completely typical and unimpaired capacity for ToM while 




that the explicit nature of experimental tests of social cognition provided a degree of 
facilitation for these high-functioning ASD individuals in a manner that would not be present 
during naturalistic, everyday social interaction. By assessing the findings of both explicit and 
implicit measures of social cognition taken from a previous study (Senju, Southgate, White, 
& Frith, 2009), including false-belief attribution (a common assessment of ToM aptitude) 
and eye-gaze tracking, Senju observed that in the absence of explicit instruction, the 
perceived advantages of high-functioning ASD individuals in ToM assessments disappear. 
The review suggests that high-functioning individuals with ASD still possess a hindered 
ability to mentalise about others, even though this ability comes with a degree of ease when 
explicitly instructed to do so. The spontaneous nature of this evoking of mental states and its 
ability to interface with memory processes therefore not only facilitates immediate social 
interaction, but plays a significant role in our developmental trajectory. However, although 
such evidence demonstrates how atypical cognitive function impairs spontaneous social 
cognition in a clinical sample, it is not revealing of how individual differences in the general 
population account for relative skill or impairment at spontaneous social and mental state 
processing. 
1.2. Origins of Mind-Mindedness 
A useful construct for understanding individual differences in the spontaneous 
application of social cognition is mind-mindedness (Meins, 1997).Mind-mindedness is a 
non-conscious tendency to focus on mental and emotional states when interpreting the 
behaviour of, or describing, other people. Mind-mindedness can be described as a measure 
of our tendency to spontaneously mentalise, or recruit and utilise ToM, in representing or 
interacting with others. Greater and lesser degrees of mind-mindedness in an individual are 
characterised by references to the mental states of others when an individual is engaged in 
discourse with or when describing others. This measure is operationalised through a coding 




Fernyhough, & Harris-Waller, 2014; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998; 
Meins, Harris-Waller, & Lloyd, 2008), which calculates the proportion of mental and 
emotional characteristics used in describing another person; higher scores for mental state 
characteristics index greater mind- mindedness.  
The concept of mind-mindedness has its origin in the field of developmental 
psychology. The description measure was first used to assess mothers’ mind-mindedness 
about their preschool children (Meins et al., 1998), but the mind-mindedness construct has 
subsequently been developed to assess mind-mindedness in relation to preverbal infants and 
mind-mindedness in adult relationships. Early literature posits mind-mindedness as a 
construct that interfaces between behavioural and representational operationalisations of a 
relationship (Meins, 1997). As such, in order to be considered more mind-minded, a 
caregiver or any individual involved in a social interaction must form a representation of the 
internal mental state of another person and then have a heightened tendency to utilise that 
representation in order to interpret the behaviour of other people. 
Aside from this scale of individuals being considered to be ‘more’ or ‘less’ mind-
minded, later literature on mind-mindedness added further dimensions of measurement in the 
form of ‘appropriate’ and ‘non-attuned’ mind-minded comments. Meins, Fernyhough, 
Fradley, and Tuckey (2001) observed interactions between mothers and their 6-month-olds 
during sessions of play and transcribed the comments made by mothers towards their infants. 
All mothers talked about their infants’ internal states to some extent, but crucially, they 
differed in the extent to which they could accurately ‘read’ what their infants were thinking 
or feeling. Appropriate mind-related comments indicate interpretations of the infant’s internal 
state considered to be accurate (e.g., saying the infant wants the ball if she looks and gestures 
toward it), whereas non-attuned mind-related comments index misinterpretations of the 
infant’s thoughts and feelings (e.g., saying the infant wants the ball when he is already 




Measured in this way, mind-mindedness can be characterised as a multidimensional 
construct, with the frequency of mental state comments indicating an overall all level of 
mind-mindedness, along with scores for appropriate mind-related comments and non-attuned 
comments. Aside from the usefulness of mind-mindedness as a measure of spontaneous 
mental state talk, both measures of appropriate and non-attuned mind-mindedness have been 
linked to developmental outcomes. Greater frequencies of appropriate mind-minded 
comments and lower frequencies of non-attuned mind-minded comments utilised by 
caregivers both independently predict secure attachment in children (Meins et al., 2001). This 
further dynamic of mind-mindedness and its implications for attachment highlight the 
importance of an increased tendency to spontaneously mentalise when interpreting the 
behaviour of others in facilitating close relationships, at least when observed in a caregiver-
child dynamic. 
The nature of mind-mindedness measurement is implicit, as during the observation of 
mother–infant interaction, no explicit instruction is given to mothers to express and interpret 
the behaviour of their children in terms of mental states. Neither are individuals instructed to 
talk about mental and emotional characteristics when given an open-ended invitation to 
describe their child, friend, or romantic partner. Mind-mindedness thus gives special insight 
into the everyday application of ToM in a non-experimental context, which allows the social-
cognitive function of ToM to be assessed without the interfering influence of direct 
instruction. Accordingly, although mind-mindedness is a concept closely related to ToM, it 
is considered an altogether separate construct. For example, the tendency to describe others 
in mind-minded ways has been shown to be unrelated to individuals’ performance on 
standard ToM tasks (Barreto, Fearon, Osório, Meins, & Martins, 2016; Meins, Fernyhough, 
Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006). In the same way, an individual utilising more mind-minded 
language does not necessarily mean their mental state comments would be considered more 




proposed that there is a competence–performance gap between individuals’ ability to 
understand others’ mental states (ToM) and the tendency spontaneously to invoke internal 
states when representing others (mind-mindedness) (Apperly, 2012; Meins et al., 2006). 
1.3. Mind-Mindedness as Spontaneous Social Cognition 
There is now a well-established literature showing that parental mind-mindedness is 
associated with a wide range of positive developmental outcomes in the child (see McMahon 
& Bernier, 2017, for a review). In contrast, attempts to identify the determinants and origins 
of mind-mindedness have shed little light on why some individuals are more mind-minded 
than others. There is no strong association between mind-mindedness and parents’ 
socioeconomic status (SES) or educational attainment, indicating that it is not the case that 
mothers from higher SES or more educated backgrounds are more mind-minded than their 
lower SES or less educated counterparts (e.g., Bernier, McMahon, & Perrier, 2017; Bigelow, 
Power, Bulmer, & Gerrior, 2015; Laranjo & Bernier, 2013; McMahon, Camberis, Berry, & 
Gibson, 2016; Meins et al., 1998; Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Turner, & Leekam, 2011). 
Although severe mental illness is associated with lower levels of mind-mindedness (Pawlby 
et al., 2010; Schacht et al., 2017), there is no convincing evidence that variations in mental 
health observed in community samples relate to mind-mindedness (e.g., Fishburn et al., 2017; 
Meins et al., 2011). Similarly, child characteristics and behaviour do not appear to make 
parents more or less mind-minded. Mothers’ appropriate and non-attuned mind-related 
comments are unrelated to infants’ general cognitive ability, gender, and interactive 
behaviour (Fishburn et al., 2017; Meins et al., 2002; Meins et al., 2011). The overarching aim 
of this thesis is to explore the determinants of mind-mindedness in an entirely new way, 
investigating the cognitive and neural correlates of adults’ mind-mindedness in relation to 
close friends. 
Like many of the sophisticated faculties of social cognition, mind-mindedness appears 




processes. Multiple sources in the literature serve to identify spontaneous cognition as one of 
the central components of the process by providing the automatic retrieval of socially- 
relevant information about the mental states of others from memory stores (Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982; Robinson & Swanson, 1990; Yang, Bossmann, Schiffhauer, Jordan, & 
Immordino-Yang, 2012; Spreng, 2013). Importantly, this process allows an individual to 
access information about the mental states of others at any point in time, even when not 
engaged in social interaction. The description method of measuring mind-mindedness as 
exemplified in the ‘Describe a Friend’ (DAF) task (Meins et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2008) 
effectively captures this phenomenon.  
Unlike other methods of recording mind-mindedness which involve transcribing 
comments made while observing interactions between individuals, the Describe a Friend task 
(Meins et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2008) is administered in interview or questionnaire format, 
with participants being asked to think about a specific significant other and describe them. As 
with other measures of mind-mindedness, no explicit instruction is given on how to describe 
other individuals during the task and any mental state comments that are included are a result 
of an individual’s internal mental narrative about a person rather than a prompt on what 
information to include. In this way, the Describe a Friend task serves as a useful 
operationalisation of mind-mindedness defined as the spontaneous tendency to mentalise 
when interpreting the behaviour of others (Meins, 1997). This task highlights how stored 
mental models of others are able to be accessed across time and in a variety of contexts 
purely by recalling socially-relevant information from memory. The assessment of mental 
state language use carried-out in the Describe a Friend task also demonstrates how important 
the interplay between spontaneous cognition and memory are in guiding our social cognition 
across time. Therefore, variance in our spontaneous cognition or in its ability to interface with 
memory systems not only leads to significant differences in how we interpret social 




past experiences and interactions. 
Just as our spontaneous thought processes must function in such a way as to allow us 
to automatically access memory stores in order for mind-mindedness to develop and function, 
the efficacy of our memory processes in encoding relevant social information provides a 
database of information from which social content can be filtered into consciousness. A series 
of studies conducted by Meins et al. (2014) assessed the level of mental state language used 
in describing different individuals or objects: children, romantic partners, close friends, 
famous figures, or works of art. Concordance in mind-minded descriptions was observed 
across different close relationships (child and partner, partner and close friend), but mind- 
minded descriptions of a significant other were unrelated to mind-mindedness in descriptions 
of famous figures or works of art. Mind-minded language use was also found to be 
significantly higher when describing a significant other than when describing the other 
targets. The authors proposed that these results highlight the relational nature of mind- 
mindedness; that rather than being a general trait-like quality of personality, mind- 
mindedness is determined by the quality of specific inter-personal relationships. 
The nature of mind-mindedness as a relational construct appears to suggest that this 
spontaneous focus on the mental states of another individual is more frequent when we are 
involved in an ongoing relational dynamic where we regularly interact with that individual, 
such as with a familiar in-group member (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams & Neale, 1996). 
When testing for levels of mind-mindedness, much work focuses primarily on interactions 
between caregivers and children, or on descriptions of close friends (Meins & Fernyhough, 
2015; Meins et al., 2014; Meins, 1997), both categories of relationship which are close, 
familiar and long-term. Mind-mindedness may therefore represent an automatic form of 
mentalisation serving to facilitate and maintain closer social relationships by drawing on 
previous experiences to predict behaviour and decipher social contexts. 




mind-mindedness is the process of implicit social learning, a form of social cognition where 
past experiences such as social interactions influence the judgement of present situations in a 
manner an individual is not consciously aware of (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). One of the 
primary functions of this form of implicit social cognition is thought to be the maintenance of 
a close in-group relational dynamic (Dunham, Baron & Banaji, 2008). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to suggest that processes of implicit social learning may serve as constituent 
components of mind-mindedness by allowing memories of past experiences to be drawn on 
in an automatic and efficient manner, assisting in the deciphering of the potential intentions 
and motivations of other people. 
As previously mentioned, mind-mindedness may be described as a non-conscious 
tendency to focus on mental and emotional states when interpreting the behaviour of, or 
describing, other people (Meins, 1997). Therefore, along with memories with which to draw 
upon potentially similar social contexts, individuals utilising mind-mindedness must therefore 
also become aware of initial social cues and signals from which to derive interpretations 
based on the mental states of others. Processes of implicit social learning have been shown to 
facilitate this implicit focus on social cues. A study performed by Hudson, Nijboer and 
Jellema (2012) compared individuals with a high intensity of autistic spectrum traits (High 
AQ) and individuals with a relative lack of autistic spectrum traits (Low AQ) on a measure of 
implicit learning for social information. Participants repeatedly observed two identities whose 
gaze and expression conveyed either a pro-social or an anti-social disposition. These 
identities were then employed in a gaze-cueing paradigm. Participants responded to a 
peripheral target that was spatially pre-cued by a gaze direction that was not predictive of 
target positioning. Analysis revealed that Low AQ individuals demonstrated a greater gaze-
cueing effect for identities conveying a pro-social disposition. These findings relate to mind-
mindedness in two interesting respects. Firstly, they demonstrate how the intentions and 




manner that may help account for the implicit focus on mental states exemplified by mind-
mindedness. Secondly, they provide evidence that pro-social dispositions or social cues 
facilitate processes of implicit social learning. These findings have interesting implications if 
we consider that heightened focus on mental states might be prevalent in closer relationships 
due to the repeated implicit social learning processes experienced from social cues we receive 
when interacting with other people. 
Along with implicit social learning for social cues such as gaze and disposition, 
numerous other faculties of social cognition are carried out in an implicit, or automatic 
manner, such as action imitation (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) and tracking the knowledge, 
goals and intentions of others (Frith & Frith, 2008; Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2003). 
Previous research has shown that representations about the mental perspectives of others are 
formed implicitly. When solving theory of mind problems such as a false belief task, Surtees 
and Apperly (2012) have shown that individuals are likely to automatically consider the 
perspectives of another individual even when aware that individuals’ perspective is 
inaccurate or does not corroborate with our own. The mere presence of an ignorant person 
may interfere with response times and recall during memory tasks about an observed 
scenario, resulting in slower responses and greater occurrences of errors as the perspective of 
an individual lacking perfect knowledge of a situation is internally represented. Accordingly, 
it appears that an important factor in understanding the mental states of other people involves 
taking into account other peoples' knowledge and perspectives on an automatic or implicit 
basis. It has been suggested that these low-level automatic processes interact in order to 
produce behaviour that encourages efficient group interactions (Frith & Frith, 2008). 
A wide variety of nonverbal social cues and signals are exchanged in every social 
interaction. Evidence suggests that our ability to predict behaviour based-upon these social 
cues we receive is related to the level of liking we have for another individual. An experiment 




another person’s behavior using nonverbal social cues. Participants played a computerized 
game of rock-paper-scissors against an avatar they believed was another participant. On some 
occasions, the avatar generated a predictive facial cue before making a play. Participants 
demonstrated a significantly greater win frequency for trials in which they received a social 
cue, even if they did not acquire explicit knowledge of the predictive nature of the cue. The 
degree to which participants could successfully predict the behaviour of the avatar related to 
their self-reported level of liking for the avatar. Interestingly, these findings demonstrate the 
importance of implicit learning processes in guiding behavior during social interactions. They 
also provide further evidence for the facilitation of implicit social learning from others in 
interactions with pro-social context, or in closer relationships. 
Further literature also suggests that processes of implicit social learning interact and 
engage with memory to produce a system where implicitly learned social information may 
influence the form and content of the memories we access in order to interpret social 
interactions. Amodio and Ratner (2011) state that implicit social processes have long been 
explained by single-system models that, while addressing questions of information 
processing, fail to explain the interface of implicit social processes with behaviour in 
everyday interactions. They proscribe that a model of implicit social learning be adopted that 
accounts for the role of memory systems in enabling the accessing of knowledge about prior 
interactions in order to inform present behaviour. Different underlying memory processes, it 
is argued, may therefore contribute towards implicit social processes and vice-versa. In this 
way, it is possible that implicit social learning may in some instances result in increased focus 
on the mental states of others, utilising episodic memories of past similar social interact ions 
with an individual in order to represent their mental states. Closer relationships may therefore 
allow for more regular instances of implicit social learning for various social cues that might 
communicate information about mental states to occur, as well as provide a greater reserve of 




be that mind-minded individuals have in some way implicitly learned or become proficient in 
recognising various social cues and signals, and subsequently utilise this information to 
provide an interpretation of the mental states and intentions of another person. Such 
interpretations of the mental states of others would naturally be more easily accomplished 
through having access to a wide range of previously shared memories and interactions such 
as those experienced in close personal relationships, which would in-turn partially account 
for the relational basis of mind-mindedness. 
In terms of cognitive processes that might underpin mind-mindedness, the tendency to 
spontaneously fixate on the mental qualities and intentions of another individual is limited by 
the readiness of previous, direct social interactions with them to be retrieved from memory. 
These findings largely accord with the earlier opinion of Spreng (2013), who suggests that 
social cognition interacts with memory capacity at a fundamental level and that the successful 
retrieval of memories of past interactions with others is essential for interpreting and 
understanding the ever-changing flow of social context in our daily activities. The relational 
basis of mind-mindedness therefore reveals the necessity of effective memory encoding and 
retrieval processes for its functional operation. In all, previous research highlights how access 
to social information and context in order to predict behaviour (Lee & Harris, 2013) relies on 
a functional memory capacity. With use of functional memory systems, we are able to draw 
upon previous similar social scenarios we have experienced (Spreng, 2013), and the 
subjective content of spontaneous thought automatically attending to social information in 
memory (Ruby et al., 2013) suggests that social context, memory and spontaneous thought 
may all function as potential components and determinants of mind-mindedness. However, 
although mind-mindedness appears to constitute a form of higher-order thought, currently the 
component processes of the construct remain unclear. Investigating this question was the first 
aim of this thesis. 




Although there is a substantial amount of behavioural evidence suggesting the role of 
memory and spontaneous cognition as essential facets of social cognition in general, previous 
research has not yet directly examined the neural correlates of mind-mindedness in the 
individual human brain. Previous work has investigated mind-mindedness on a neural and 
functional level in a longitudinal study investigating relations between mothers’ mind- 
mindedness in infancy and children’s brain connectivity at age 10. Dégeilh, Bernier, Leblanc, 
Daneault, and Beauchamp (2018) found that functional connectivity between the Default 
Mode Network (DMN; involved in introspective processing and social and affective 
cognition) and salience network (involved in detecting salient information and cognitive 
control) was associated with higher levels of mind-mindedness. This study provides the first 
evidence that early mind-mindedness is associated with children’s processing of social 
cognition at a neural level. However, although previous work has established an association 
between mind-mindedness and functional variance in large-scale brain networks, as stated no 
current research directly investigates the neural correlates of mind-mindedness on an 
individual basis – addressing this goal is one of the unique contributions of this thesis. 
Evidence gathered from previous research suggests that the frontoparietal cortex is 
specifically involved in producing internal representations of the mental states of others. 
Mitchell, Banaji and Macrae (2005) scanned participants using fMRI while they performed a 
task requiring them to associate words with one of two categories: people or dogs. For each 
target participants were required to judge whether word described a potential psychological 
state or a physical body part of the target, finding that greater mPFC activation accompanied 
judgments of psychological states compared to body parts regardless of whether the target 
was a person or a dog, indicating the role of the mPFC in representing the psychological 
states of others.  
More recent research further evidences this fact. Moran, Jolly and Mitchell (2014) 




underlying dispositions and personality traits often exists, known as the fundamental 
attribution error. The extent to which the fundamental attribution error results from a 
spontaneous processing of mental states was tested by having participants complete a task 
during fMRI where they were required to read a set of stories and judge whether a series of 
social behaviours carried-out by individuals were attributable to their internal disposition or 
to a situational factor. The researchers found that brain regions commonly associated with 
mental state inference, namely the mPFC, strongly predicted whether participants attributed 
behaviours to internal disposition. These results suggest that a heightened tendency to fixate 
on mental states when interpreting behaviour, facilitated through heightened mPFC 
activation, underlies the tendency for fundamental attribution error and further highlights the 
role of the mPFC as contributing towards spontaneous mentalisation. 
Previous research also links the mPFC to social cognitive function through identifying 
its role in representing information about social stereotypes. Contreras, Benaji and Mitchell 
(2012) observed that when participants made judgements about social and non-social 
categories during fMRI, social judgements were specifically accompanied by heightened 
activation in brain regions associated with social cognition, including the mPFC, posterior 
cingulate and left temporo-parietal junction. These results suggest that social-stereotype 
information is represented distinctly from general semantic information, with dissociable 
patterns of activation involving the mPFC in navigating social scenarios.  
A large degree of neuroscientific evidence suggests that communication between 
brain regions associated with both spontaneous thought generation and memory retrieval may 
possess a significant degree of influence over social-cognitive processes. A meta-analysis 
conducted by Mars et al. (2012) concluded that brain regions with activations sensitive to 
tests of social cognition share a significant degree of overlap with the DMN, specifically in 
medial-prefrontal and parietal brain regions. The authors propose that the remarkable degree 




system’ suggests that the default-mode of cognitive function facilitates a predisposition 
towards spontaneous social cognition, and that the DMN contributes towards the dedication 
of idle mental resources towards social-cognitive processes. These findings suggest that 
DMN functioning may contribute towards the application of mind-mindedness, given that 
mind-mindedness fundamentally involves an involuntary or unconscious predisposition 
towards the processing of mental states. 
Interestingly, the DMN has also been suggested to interact with memory systems in 
order to automatically retrieve social-contextual information from memory. Spreng et al. 
(2014) exposed participants to a series of social stimuli in the form of human faces. A portion 
of these faces were of anonymous, unknown individuals, while the rest were famous 
(presumably known) celebrities. After a period of distraction Spreng et al. (2014) had 
participants attempt to recall the series of faces during fMRI, and observed heightened 
activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (pCC), a major hub of the DMN, while recalling 
the famous faces, but not the faces of unknown individuals. The major implication of these 
findings is that, as participants had no knowledge about individual faces presented in the 
anonymous/unknown condition beyond the immediate physical features of the face, increased 
pCC activity in response to exposure to a known or famous face appears to reflect the 
retrieval of information other than encoded facial features. Spreng et al. (2014) accordingly 
assert that this observed pCC activity is heavily involved in enabling the automatic retrieval 
of social-contextual information about an individual from memory in response to the physical 
stimulus of an observed face. The DMN therefore appears to operate in a manner crucial for 
the successful development and execution of spontaneous social-cognitive faculties such as 
mind-mindedness by providing neural mechanisms (as observed in the pCC) allowing the 
interface of spontaneous cognitive and memory retrieval processes. 
Previous literature accordingly provides evidence that the DMN interacts with areas 




appears to be responsible for the manifestation and execution of a sizeable portion of the 
myriad automatic or non-volitional aspects of social cognition. However, the DMN is a large- 
scale interconnected neural network and it is currently unknown how brain regions 
responsible for social information processing integrate with the DMN in order to produce a 
workable spontaneous social cognition. Although the exact neural mechanisms responsible 
for the functioning of spontaneous social processes such as mind-mindedness are unknown, 
previous neuroscientific evidence suggests that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) may 
constitute a major neural component of mind-mindedness through the encoding of social cues 
and context and the subsequent relaying of this information to various nodes of the DMN. 
The TPJ is often recruited when participants attempt explicit measures of social- 
cognitive capacity (such as ToM assessments) and appears to reflect an individual 
undertaking an act of deliberate and effortful mentalisation (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
However, literature highlighting the role of the TPJ in spontaneous social cognition is scarce. 
Anticevic, Repovs, Shulman, and Barch (2010) observed that the TPJ, while not part of the 
DMN, may exhibit heightened levels of functional connectivity with the DMN depending on 
task demands, specifically noting decreases in activation in both default and social-cognitive 
networks when performing demanding cognitive tasks. However, this observation offers no 
further information on what the resultant function of TPJ–DMN connectivity might be. Assaf 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that TPJ and default network interaction may be important for 
mentalisation about others through the association of abnormal DMN connectivity and long- 
term deficits in ToM ability (a task in which TPJ functioning is usually implicated; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003). Specifically, individuals on the autistic spectrum with greater deficits in 
ToM ability have underdeveloped DMN functional connectivity patterns. The authors state 
that decreased connectivity between the DMN and the various sub-networks involved in 
social information processing may result in core deficits in ToM ability. Therefore it appears 




such as the TPJ underlies the ability to apply ToM in day-to-day scenarios in the long term. 
Along with evidence gathered from classical fMRI methods, resting-state fMRI 
(rfMRI) provides a wealth of evidence suggesting heavy coupling between social-cognitive 
and default-mode networks. Taking the peak activation voxel co-ordinates for the TPJ 
reported by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) as a seed region, a Neurosynth (Yarkoni, Poldrack, 
Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) meta-analysis reveals a large degree of functional 
connectivity between the TPJ and DMN nodes (see Figure 1.1), specifically revealing 









Figure 1.1. (Top) The functional connectivity map for the Temporo-Parietal Junction (TPJ) 
based on the voxel seed region taken from Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) in Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Functional connectivity demonstrated between the TPJ, 
the pCC and the mPFC (Bottom). The functional connectivity map for the DMN based on a 
seed taken from Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, and Menon (2003) in MNI space. Images 





A study conducted by Von dem Hagen et al. (2011) links reduced levels of resting- 
state functional connectivity between the DMN and social cognitive networks including the 
TPJ to impairment of the ability to mentalise in ToM assessments in individuals on the 
autistic spectrum. Such results complement the earlier findings of Assaf et al. (2010) by 
demonstrating that social-cognitive impairment may not only be traced to abnormal DMN 
intra-connectivity, but also how the DMN interacts and communicates with other networks 
in the resting brain. Such evidence highlights the importance of a constellation of disparate 
brain regions interacting effectively to produce a working social cognition, and suggests 
that connectivity between the TPJ and DMN may play an important role in producing the 
spontaneous aspects of social cognition seen in mind-mindedness. Mars et al. (2012) have 
furthered this perspective through a commentary on why brain networks associated with 
spontaneous thought generation might play such a significant role in social cognition, 
stating that “the largely unconstrained nature of social decision making, including its 
reliance on potentially multiple instances of recursive thinking might be one reason why 
social cognition relies on a network such as the DMN” (Mars et al., 2012, pp.7). The 
implications of this view suggest that the DMN may provide a means for spontaneous 
social-cognitive systems to operate in a manner much more efficient than purely volitional 
and effortful social memory retrieval. As a measure of spontaneous social cognition, mind-
mindedness may therefore serve as a faculty facilitating this spontaneous aspect of social-
cognition. Accordingly, the second major aim of this thesis is to investigate neuroimaging 
links with mind-mindedness in order to move towards an understanding of mind-
mindedness as a form of higher-order social cognition, in terms of its neural components. 
1.5. Thesis Aims: Deconstructing Mind-Mindedness 
Given the mass of psychological and neuroscientific evidence linking our capacity for 
memory, the nature of our spontaneous thought, and the functioning of our social cognitive 




better understood through the development of a component-process account of the construct, 
with the cognitive mechanisms enabling memory retrieval and spontaneous thought 
generation as fundamental sub-processes allowing the emergence of mind-mindedness as a 
form of higher-order thought. It is also proposed that that these subcomponents can be 
assessed utilising MRI techniques to identify the behaviour of the neural components of 
mind-mindedness under various forms of experimental manipulation. The two major aims 
therefore are to first identify the potential cognitive subcomponents of mind-mindedness 
through investigation of its behavioural correlates, then to implement neuroscientific 
techniques in order to identify the neural correlates of mind-mindedness. 
The first major aim of outlining the behavioural correlates of mind-mindedness 
yields a two-fold benefit. Firstly, it allows the utilisation of a series of tests with the aim of 
triangulating areas where mind-mindedness utilises common cognitive resources with some 
other behavioural construct. Secondly, it aids in the translation of mind-mindedness from a 
largely qualitative measure into a component-process model which we can utilise to inform 
and elaborate upon fMRI results. If a number of essential cognitive subcomponents of mind- 
mindedness can be successfully identified through behavioural testing, then it becomes 
possible to develop measures and manipulations of mind-mindedness that might be possible 
to subsequently administer in future fMRI contexts. For example, previous research 
suggests the involvement of brain areas such as the pCC, mPFC and left-TPJ in social 
cognition generally (Mars et al., 2012), and the mPFC and pCC in mentalisation and 
memory encoding respectively. Understanding mind-mindedness as being composed of 
behavioural components that recruit these disparate brain regions will inform our 
subsequent interpretation of the neural network enabling mind-mindedness and the potential 
role of the various brain regions comprising it. 
This initial stage will utilise the DAF task (Meins et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2008) in 




describing a friend from memory. The interview format of the DAF task allows for a simple 
task-paradigm which participants can complete in their own time and measures of 
spontaneous mental state language use can be gathered without need for the experimental 
observation of ongoing interactions. As such, of the two dimensions of mind-mindedness 
discussed previously, for the purposes of fulfilling the aim of exploring the neural correlates 
of mind-mindedness, the proportion of ‘appropriate’ and ‘non-attuned’ mind-minded 
comments will not be assessed. Only an individual’s tendency to be more or less mind-
minded and spontaneously focus on mental states will be measured. Investigating this aspect 
of mind-mindedness as an initial inquiry is necessary when utilising the DAF task format as 
opposed to coding and observing interactions, as it is not possible to interpret the mental state 
language of participants as being appropriate or non-attuned in response to a social cue in an 
ongoing social scenario. This approach however may potentially yield answers essential for 
understanding mind-mindedness for the first time in terms of its component processes by 
linking mind-mindedness, defined as variance in the tendency to spontaneously mentalise, 
with potential behavioural correlates and underlying neural components 
Parallel to this deconstruction of mind-mindedness into subcomponents, the second 
major aim involves directly comparing variance in levels of inter-network connectivity in the 
resting brain with DAF task scores for mind-mindedness in order to begin building a 
component-process model of the neural correlates of mind-mindedness. Techniques of rfMRI 
allow for the exploration of the direct association of mind-mindedness with functional 
networks in the resting brain by identifying brain regions associated with spontaneous social 
cognition, and implementing seed-based analysis techniques to produce connectivity maps 
between brain regions associated with variation in scores for conventional measures of mind-
mindedness. The benefit of utilising rfMRI in this investigation is the ability to compare 
established measures of mind-mindedness with functional connectivity throughout the brain, 




in levels of mind-mindedness. Accordingly, the second major aim will be carried-out in three 
stages. The first stage being the administration of a battery of tests to participants that might 
reveal measures sharing a degree of behavioural correlation with mind-mindedness. The 
second stage is exploring these correlates to inform our search and interpretations when 
attempting to link neural mechanisms with variance in mind-mindedness. The third and final 
stage is taking standard measurements of mind-mindedness in the form of responses to the 
DAF task and exploring the direct neural correlates of the construct of mind-mindedness in 






Study 1: Exploring the Behavioural Components of Mind-Mindedness 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Understanding the people with whom we interact helps place their behaviour in an 
appropriate context, allowing us to make sense of why they are behaving in a particular way 
(Higgins, 2000). Consequently, when we interact with another person, we often retrieve 
information from memory that is either specific to the individual in question, or has a more 
general relationship to our social world. When an individual’s interpretation of another 
person’s behaviour is guided by the recognition that the other person has an internal world 
rich with hopes and desires, the individual is demonstrating mind-mindedness (Meins, 
1997). Mind-mindedness in relation to adults and children from preschool age onwards is 
assessed in terms of the individual’s tendency spontaneously to focus on mental 
characteristics when given an open-ended invitation to describe a person (Meins, 
Fernyhough, Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 
1998; Meins, Harris-Waller, & Lloyd, 2008). 
A growing body of literature has demonstrated that parents’ mind-mindedness is 
associated with a wide range of positive outcomes in the child. In particular, parental mind- 
mindedness is a positive predictor of children’s own understanding of emotions and beliefs 
(Centifanti, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2016; Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & de 
Rosnay, 2013; Meins et al., 1998), and is negatively correlated with reported parenting 
stress (Demers, Bernier, Tarabulsy, & Provost, 2010; McMahon & Meins, 2012). Research 
has also investigated mind-mindedness in relation to close friends in both children (Meins et 
al., 2006) and adults (Meins, Fernyhough & Harris-Waller, 2014; Meins et al., 2008). 
However, much less is known about the factors that determine whether or not an individual 




mindedness about their best friend was unrelated to their ToM abilities, and Barreto, Pasco 
Fearon, Osório, Meins, and Martins (2016) also reported the same null finding for the 
relation between parents’ mind-mindedness and ToM performance. It has therefore been 
proposed that there is a competence–performance gap between ToM abilities and mind-
mindedness—although an individual possesses the capacity to understand others’ internal 
states, this is not sufficient for them spontaneously to represent others in terms of their 
internal states and thus demonstrate mind-mindedness (Apperly, 2012; Meins et al., 2006). 
Previous research has investigated relations between mind-mindedness and 
mentalising abilities largely using measures of explicit mental representation, such as 
comparison between mind-mindedness and proficiency in ToM tasks (Meins, Fernyhough, 
Arnott, Leekam & de Rosnay, 2013;Meins, Fernyhough, Wainwright, Das Gupta, Fradley, 
& Tuckey, 2002). The aim of the present study was to investigate whether mind-mindedness 
relates to implicit mentalising abilities. Mind-mindedness can be described as a tendency to 
spontaneously mentalise (Meins et al., 2008; Meins et al., 2006; Meins et al., 1998; Meins, 
1997), and therefore should in part depend upon the functioning of lower order processes of 
implicit cognition. Implicit social learning, a form of social cognition where past 
experiences such as social interactions influence the judgement of present situations in a 
manner an individual is not consciously aware of (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), may play a 
role in contributing towards mind-mindedness as a constituent process. Dunham, Baron and 
Banaji (2008) have suggested that one of the major outcomes of social learning is to 
maintain stable relationships and a healthy group dynamic. Accordingly, processes of 
implicit social learning may contribute towards the spontaneous nature of mind-mindedness 
by encouraging focus on mental states in order to make sense of the many complex events 
we encounter during social interactions. 
Social interactions are complex and dynamic events requiring the integration of 




others (Mitchell, Macrae & Banaji, 2004). Processes of implicit social learning have been 
shown to interact and engage with memory to produce a system where learned social 
information may influence the form and content of the memories we access in order to 
interpret social interactions (Amodio & Ratner, 2011). This type of learning may in part 
explain why mind-minded individuals demonstrate an unconscious bias towards attending 
and subsequently assigning mental states to the social cues they receive when engaged in 
social interactions, or when describing close others. It is possible that implicit social 
learning processes may play a part in determining this increased focus on the mental states 
of others that is characteristic of mind-mindedness, allowing individuals to utilise memories 
of past similar social interactions and social cues in order to assign meaning to events 
occurring in the social world.  
Evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that information from memory is 
important in various aspects of social cognition. Neuroimaging studies have shown that 
there is a close overlap between the neural recruitment that occurs during social cognition 
and systems that are important in conceptual (i.e., semantic) and autobiographical (i.e., 
episodic) memory (Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jaglela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008). These 
studies highlight regions in the temporal lobe, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and 
posterior cingulate that collectively constitute the DMN. Studies have also shown that the 
DMN is active during situations when we are not engaged in any explicit external task 
(Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard, & Shulman, 2001) and when states such as 
daydreaming or mind- wandering are common (McKiernen, D’Angelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 
2006). 
Previous work carried out by Bird, Keidel, Ing, Horner, and Burgess (2015) also 
highlights the role of the DMN, and in particular the posterior cingulate in encoding the 
complex information contained in social interactions to memory as a narrative. Bird et al. 




many of these video clips portraying social interactions as examples of complex event 
sequences. Bird et al. (2015) gave participants the opportunity to mentally rehearse the 
content of a subset of these video clips during fMRI and found that forming a narrative 
about what was observed during the course of the events displayed, and subsequently 
rehearsing that narrative, greatly improved subsequent recall of the contents of the clip. 
Also, greater posterior cingulate activity was observed when participants were given the 
opportunity to rehearse the information depicted in the clips, suggesting that one role of the 
posterior cingulate is encoding events into narratives that may be accessed from memory. 
Given that mind-mindedness is expressed as a heightened tendency to spontaneously 
retrieve social information from memory when interpreting behaviour (Meins, 1997), it is 
possible that the posterior cingulate, and the related cognitive processes of event 
segmentation and narrative formation, play important roles as component processes of mind-
mindedness, allowing us to string together social cues and events into coherent narratives 
about the mental states of others. 
The mind-wandering experience characterised by increased DMN and posterior 
cingulate activity is also related to an increased frequency of socially-oriented content in 
subjective thought. Recent research demonstrates that the content of mind-wandering 
experiences often involve thoughts about other people (Ruby et al., 2013; Engert, 
Smallwood, & Singer, 2014), suggesting that the spontaneous thoughts that occupy our 
minds during the mind-wandering state may reflect a form of social cognition, albeit one 
that is generated entirely from information from memory. Consistent with this view, it has 
recently been shown that people who show high levels of social cognitive information 
during spontaneous thought generate high numbers of solutions to social problems (Ruby et 
al., 2013). Neuroimaging has suggested that forms of social affective spontaneous thoughts 
depend on the integration of information from regions of the temporal lobe that has a 




Evidence gathered from Mitchell, Banaji and Macrae (2005) suggests that socially 
relevant information is stored in memory via functionally distinct networks from general 
semantic information. Although social cognition has been shown to share a large amount of 
common neural architecture with conceptual and autobiographical memory (Schilbach, 
Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jaglela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008), Mitchell et al. (2005) reported greater 
mPFC activation accompanied judgments specifically pertaining to psychological states and 
not for more general associations involving body parts. These findings demonstrate the 
importance of encoding relevant social information to memory in order to navigate the world 
around us through showing the existence of distinct patterns of neural activity designed to 
help facilitate our understanding of social phenomena. Further, Meins et al. (2014) have 
shown that individuals demonstrate greater levels of mind-mindedness when describing 
individuals they know personally, as opposed to famous figures and works of art. These 
findings highlight the relational nature of mind-mindedness, and suggest that shared episodic 
memories of interactions with other people help facilitate mind-mindedness. Together, the 
findings of Mitchell et al. (2005) and Meins et al. (2014) present mind-mindedness as a form 
of higher-order cognition involving greater focus on the psychological states of others in 
order to facilitate and maintain social relationships with the people we share social 
interactions with.  
The present study therefore sought to test whether two aspects of social memory are 
linked to mind-mindedness: semantic and episodic. First, we investigated whether 
individuals’ implicit use of semantic information to understand a personally familiar 
individual was associated with mind-mindedness. To explore this issue, we asked participants 
to perform a modified implicit association test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 
(1998) in which they had to associate concepts related to mental and physical states with 
themselves, a personally familiar other (their best friend), a familiar person who they do not 




tested whether mind-mindedness would be associated with an increased reaction time when 
associating mental states with personally known others.  
Second, we tested whether mind-mindedness is linked to better memory for social 
stimuli by assessing accuracy of recognition of social information in silent film clips using a 
similar design to that employed by Bird, Keidel, Ing, Horner, and Burgess (2015). The 
present study explored whether mind-mindedness was reflected in how social events are 
remembered and how this is linked to the generation of a narrative about the event. The silent 
movie clips included social interactions either between people or between animals. It was 
tested whether mind-mindedness would be associated with an increased recognition for 
human clips, containing a richer variety of socially-relevant information then animal clips. It 
was also tested whether an opportunity for rehearsal would further exaggerate this effect in 
more mind-minded individuals. 
Mind-mindedness, unlike ToM, is of course measured implicitly, without any given 
instruction to focus on social (or any other) categories of information. A modified IAT 
therefore allows for an implicit measure of semantic bias, in order to investigate the extent to 
which mind-mindedness possesses an attitudinal component. The silent movies task 
implemented utilises a more explicit assessment of memory by asking participants whether 
they recognise information contained in video clips they have previously seen. However, 
during this test no instruction is given on what information to attend to and the measurement 
of accuracy levels for human/animal, or rehearsed/not rehearsed clips allows for an implicit 
assessment of whether individuals scoring higher in mind-mindedness show a bias towards 
remembering clips with more relevant social information included within them. Therefore, it 
was hypothesised that participants would show quicker reaction times when associating 
mental concepts with personally known others during the IAT due to socially-relevant 
information being encoded utilising neural networks distinct from general semantic 




scoring higher in mind-mindedness due to the relational nature of the construct in causing 
fixation on the mental states of known others (Meins et al., 2014). It was also hypothesised 
that participants would show increased recall for human clips compared to animal clips 
during the SMT, and that rehearsal of the content of these clips would improve later accuracy 
in tests of recognition for clip content for both animal and human clips. Finally, it was 
hypothesised that the bias towards recognition of content from human clips would be 
emphasised in individuals scoring higher for mind-mindedness. 
In summary, the present study investigated the proposal that there is a competence– 
performance gap between ToM abilities and mind-mindedness by exploring relations 
between implicit mentalising and mind-mindedness. We also examined the proposal that 
mind-mindedness is a relational construct by investigating associations between mind- 
mindedness and the accuracy of recognition of social information about unknown targets. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
A total of 70 participants between the ages of 18 and 35 years (M = 20.77, SD = 4.49) 
were recruited for the study. Most participants recruited were psychology undergraduates. All 
participants recruited were native English speakers. 
2.2.2. Materials and Methods 
Participants completed three tasks in a single testing session, administered using a 
counterbalanced design. Participants were tested individually. 
2.2.2.1. Describe a Friend Task (DAF) 
Mind-Mindedness was assessed using the Describe a Friend (DAF) task (Meins et al., 
2008, 2014), administered via a computer. The Describe a Friend task (Meins et al., 2008, 
2014) allows a measurement of the frequency with which information about the mental states 
of others is spontaneously referred to even when participants are not actively engaged in 





Participants were presented with a blank screen with the instruction to think of a 
specific close friend and type a description of the friend in the text box. The on-screen 
instructions informed participants that they could (a) include any information about their 
friend they thought was relevant, (b) make their response as long or as short as they wished, 
and (c) take as long as they wished, but aim to spend around five minutes on the task. 
Participant responses were later coded for mind-mindedness according to the Mind- 
Mindedness Coding Manual criteria (Meins & Fernyhough, 2015). The text was first divided 
into discreet descriptions that could be single words, phrases, or sentences. Each description 
was then placed into one of the following exhaustive and exclusive categories: (a) Mind-
minded: references to the emotions, mental life, or intellect of the person being described 
(e.g., ‘they enjoy meeting a challenge’, ‘she has a very active imagination’), including 
references to shared mental characteristics (e.g., ‘we’re often on the same wavelength’, ‘we 
both tend to overthink things’), (b) Behavioural: activities or interactions with others that 
can be interpreted on a purely behavioural level (e.g., ‘he is usually the first to speak-up’, 
‘she avoids long journeys when possible’), the person’s occupation, or information about the 
subjects the person is studying (e.g., ‘they recently started the second year of their degree’, 
‘he currently works for a marketing company’), (c) Physical: any physical characteristics, 
including age, family relationships (e.g., ‘she is 20 years old’, ‘he has two brothers’), 
references to style of dress, or judgements on attractiveness (e.g., ‘he’s a good-looking guy’, 
‘she’s very fashionable’ ), (d) Self-referential: comments in which the primary reference is 
self-focused rather than describing the friend (e.g., ‘I always look forward to our next meet- 
up’, ‘they have a certain way of making me laugh’), (e) Relationship: comments that focus 
on the relationship rather than either of the individuals involved (e.g., ‘‘we are like sisters”), 
compare or contrast themselves with the friend (e.g., “we are opposites”), or describe when 




General: miscellaneous comments not belonging to any of the above categories (e.g., where 
the person grew up or currently lives, stating the person’s name), including non-specific 
value judgements (e.g., ‘they don’t always make the best choices’, ‘they have fantastic 
taste’). 
All descriptions were coded by a trained researcher who was blind to all other data, 
and a randomly selected 25% were coded by a second trained, blind researcher: inter-rater 
reliability was  = .95. Participants received scores for each category as a percentage of the 
total number of descriptions produced in order to control for the amount written. Scores for 
mind-minded descriptions indexed participants’ mind-mindedness in relation to their close 
friends, and scores for physical descriptions were selected to index participants’ 
knowledge of their friends that did not emphasise internal states. 
2.2.2.2. Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
The IAT was based on the procedure first outlined by Greenwald et al., (1998). 
Participants first completed a practise section where two categories, ‘Mental’ and ‘Physical’, 
were displayed at the top left and right-hand sides of the screen respectively. After a 3 to 5 
second delay, a target word appeared in the centre of the screen and participants were 
required to associate the word with the left or right-hand category by pressing the left or 
right arrow button on their keyboard; response time (RT) was recorded. The word appearing 
in the centre was taken from a list of ten words; 5 ‘mental words’ (‘Intelligence, ‘Wisdom’, 
‘Logic’, ‘Attentiveness’, ‘Empathy’) and 5 ‘physical words (‘Agility’ ‘Athleticism’, 
‘Dexterity’, ‘Speed’, ‘Strength’). The practice section ensured that participants understood 
the basics of the task, with the assumption that all ‘mental words’ would be associated with 
the ‘Mental’ category and that all ‘physical words’ would be associated with the ‘Physical’ 
category. Each word was displayed once, making the practise section consist of 10 trials. 
Each trial only progressed once the participant had given a response. Participants on average 




After the practise section was completed, participants were required to associate the 
mental and physical words with four categories: ‘Self’, ‘Best Friend’, ‘Lady Gaga’, and 
‘Weather’. The categories of self and best friend allowed an examination of how people 
differ in terms of how they categorise themselves and a close personal friend. Lady Gaga 
allows us to explore if any bias generalises to an individual who is not known personally, 
while the weather acts as a physical control condition.  
Each category was compared with each of the others a total of four times in each 
block of testing, twice in a congruent manner and twice in an incongruent manner. 
According to the findings of Bradford, Jentzsch and Gomez (2015), individuals exercise 
considerably less cognitive effort when associating mental characteristics with themselves 
than with other people. In addition, according to Meins et al. (2014), mind-mindedness is 
highest when making judgements about people we know personally, followed by people we 
do not know personally, then finally inanimate objects. Therefore, congruent trials consisted 
of participants making word associations with mental concepts being primarily sorted with 
the Self category, then the Best Friend category, and so on while incongruent trials consisted 
of participants making word associations with mental concepts being primarily sorted with 
the Weather category then the Lady Gaga category, and so on.  
Congruent trials required participants to associate mental words with the category 
hypothesised to be most associated with mental words, and associate physical words with 
the category hypothesised to be most associated with physical words. For example, it was 
hypothesised that mental words would be most easy to associate with the Self category, 
followed by the Best Friend category, then Lady Gaga, then Weather. Likewise, it was also 
hypothesised that physical words would be most easy to associate with the Weather 
category, followed by the Lady Gaga category, then Best Friend, then Self. 
Incongruent trials required participants to associate mental and physical words with the 




terms with the weather.  In this way, it was hoped that semantic/implicit attitudinal 
association would be able to be measured along a dimension of ‘relational closeness’ from 
self, to a known other, to an unknown other, to a non-living process in a manner reflecting the 
categories of people/objects assessed in Meins’ et al. (2014)  earlier study. The IAT session 
consisted of two blocks containing 20 trials each (10 congruent trials and 10 incongruent 
trials). Average participant RT (in milliseconds) for congruent and incongruent trials across 
the three categories was recorded and used for the subsequent analyses. 
2.2.2.3. Silent Movies Task (SMT) 
In order to select the stimuli for the SMT, 20 participants rated a series of 48 movie 
clips for the purpose of identifying key moments in each clip that would be used to probe 
participants’ memory for events. The movie clips were stripped of audio, ensuring 
participants only used visual information. Half of the movie clips (24) portrayed humans 
engaging in some form of interaction, the other half involved animals. All movie clips were 
sampled from YouTube content and lasted approximately 30 seconds. Participants were 
instructed to press a button every time an event occurred on-screen that they felt helped them 
understand the wider social context of the clip. This resulted in a dataset containing a number 
of important moments for each movie clip. For each clip, the most commonly chosen event 
was selected, and a still image of the frame was taken for later use as a stimulus in the main 
study. Any ambiguity about which time-point in a clip contained the most prominent event 
was resolved by selecting the event that was associated with the most visually clear frame 
(being free of motion blur, obfuscating objects in the foreground, etc.). Therefore, at the 
completion of this initial stage, a still image associated with the moment/event of most social 
significance from each movie clip was collected, giving a total of 48 still images. 
The main aim of the SMT was to identify a participant’s memory for scenes in the 
social and control silent movies. Following prior studies demonstrating that describing films 




the generation of a narrative has a particular impact on social films. The SMT had four 
stages. Participants first watched a set of silent clips involving either people or animals, after 
which they performed a short distraction task. They then described a set of clips, and finally 
completed a surprise memory task on material covered in the clips. 
In the initial phase, participants watched half of the movie clips (12 animal and 12 
human), selected at random. A title for each clip was displayed on-screen during movie 
presentation. After watching all 24 clips, participants performed a Stroop task to prevent 
mental rehearsal. Next, participants were asked to describe half of the clips they had seen (6 
human and 6 animal). Participant descriptions of the movie clips were recorded using 
Microsoft Word and the procedure involved participants being shown nothing but the title of 
a clip at the top of the page, and instructions asking them to recall as much information as 
possible about the clip and type it in the blank space. This created two groups of the 24 clips 
that were shown to each participant: 12 clips that had been rehearsed and 12 clips that had not 
been rehearsed. Finally, participants underwent a recognition test that involved the still 
scenes rated for significance as determined by the pilot study. The scenes from all 48 clips 
were shown, so that participants had previously watched the associated movie clip for only 
half of the scenes, and furthermore, had only mentally rehearsed the content of a quarter of 
the movie clips associated with the scenes. Participants were required to indicate via the press 
of one of two keys whether they had previously watched the clip associated with the still 
image or not. SMT movies were assorted into two variables with two levels: a ‘description’ 
variable (not described clips and described clips) and a ‘species’ variable (animal and human 
clips). Recognition accuracy for rehearsed and non-rehearsed animal and human clips was 
then assessed by calculating the proportion of movie clips successfully remembered for each 
participant. 
2.3. Results 




Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Shapiro-Wilk tests showed 
data from all categories of the DAF task to be non-normally distributed with the exception of 
mind-minded descriptions, p = .058; non-parametric bivariate correlations were therefore 
used in subsequent analyses involving these variables. 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for All DAF Variables. 
 
 
 Mean SD Range 
DAF mind-minded .26 .17 .63 
DAF behavioural .26 .26 .70 
DAF physical .13 .15 .78 
DAF self-reference .06 .06 .37 
DAF relationship .18 .18 .71 
DAF general .10 .10 .60 
Note: DAF = Describe a Friend. Scores for the DAF are proportions. 
 
Table 2.2 shows the results of correlation analyses for all DAF variables; alpha was 
adjusted to .003 (.05/15) for multiple comparisons. As shown in Table 2.2, there were 
negative correlations between behavioural and relationship response categories and self- 
reference and physical response categories. No significant relation was observed between 
mind-minded and physical DAF response categories, evidencing the suitability of the 








 1 2 3 4 5 
1. DAF mind-minded -     
2. DAF physical -.22 -    
3. DAF relationship -.36 -.29 -   
4. DAF behavioural .01 .09 -.57* -  
5. DAF self-reference -.22 -.44* .37 -.30 - 
6. DAF general -.21 -.10 -.04 -.25 .08 
* p < .003 (adjusted alpha level) 
Note: DAF = Describe a Friend task. 
 
Due to non-normal data distribution in the DAF mental and physical language 
variables, participants were accordingly also placed into ‘high’ and ‘low’ categories for 
mind-minded and physical descriptions scores based on a median split of the data. As a 
further sanity check to ensure that the decision to assort participant responses into groups of 
‘high’ and ‘low’ use of mental language use did not lead to any misrepresentation of the data 
distribution, the DAF mental description category was again separated into four groups, 
displaying quartiles of response ranges, made-up of equal percentiles of responses in each 
group (labelled ‘first quartile’ to ‘fourth quartile’ from lowest-to-highest; see Figure 2.1). 
Further separation of the binarised mental language use group into quartiles revealed a 
relatively equal distribution of participants across the four groups, indicating that continuing 
with subsequent analyses utilising the binarised DAF groups would not simplify the dataset 
in a manner that missed out on more subtle relationships between the proportional 




Figure 2.1. Quartiles of DAF Task Mental Language Use. 
 
Figure 2.1: Number of participants in each quartile of average mental language use during 
the DAF task. Number of participants is plotted on the y-axis. Quartiles of mental language 
use are plotted on the x-axis. 
 
Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare the mean RT for the congruent and 
incongruent levels of the six IAT conditions. For the following analyses related to the IAT, 
we controlled for the number of comparisons being made by adopting a p value of < .008. 
Significant differences were observed between RTs in the Self/Best Friend condition, with 
participants taking longer to complete word associations during the incongruent category 
compared to the congruent category, t(65) = 3.01, p =.004, suggesting that participants found 
greater ease in performing congruent trials (matching mental and physical terms with their 
most obvious associates). The same pattern was true for the Self/Lady Gaga condition, t(65) 
= 3.76, p < .001, and the Self/Weather condition, t(65) = 3.10, p = .003. Similar differences 
were also seen for RTs between the congruent and incongruent trials for the Best 
Friend/Lady Gaga condition, t(65) = 2.98, p = .004, and the Best Friend/Weather condition, 




condition, t(56) = 0.24, p =.812 (see Table 2.3 for descriptive statistics for all IAT variables 
and Figure 2.2 for all initial IAT results). These data confirm the hypothesis that participants 
show the strongest mental association with Self followed by the Best Friend (the person for 













IAT self/best friend (congruent) 1354.52 321.88 1660.00 
IAT self/best friend (incongruent) 1460.48 377.91 1455.60 
IAT self/Lady Gaga (congruent) 1204.99 264.82 1285.65 
IAT self/Lady Gaga (incongruent) 1276.91 286.02 1344.75 
IAT self/weather (congruent) 1119.33 246.18 1180.15 
IAT self/weather (incongruent) 1216.44 367.41 1825.15 
IAT best friend/Lady Gaga (congruent) 1101.53 279.66 1528.15 
IAT best friend/Lady Gaga (incongruent) 1177.66 375.72 1640.60 
IAT best friend/weather (congruent) 1027.83 275.16 1194.25 
IAT best friend/weather (incongruent) 1104.23 313.12 1430.50 
IAT Lady Gaga/weather (congruent) 1040.35 370.30 1631.05 




Figure 2.2. IAT Response Times. 
 
Figure 2.2. A: Response time for Congruent and Incongruent presentations of the Self/Best 
Friend condition. Mean RT (milliseconds) is plotted on the y-axis. Congruent and 
Incongruent levels are plotted on the x-axis. B: Response time for Congruent and 
Incongruent presentations of the Self/Lady Gaga condition. Mean RT (milliseconds) is 
plotted on the y-axis. Congruent and Incongruent levels are plotted on the x-axis. C: 
Response time for Congruent and Incongruent presentations of the Self/Weather condition. 
Mean RT (milliseconds) is plotted on the y-axis. Congruent and Incongruent levels are 
plotted on the x-axis. D: Response time for Congruent and Incongruent presentations of the 
Best Friend/Lady Gaga condition. Mean RT (milliseconds) is plotted on the y-axis. 
Congruent and Incongruent levels are plotted on the x-axis. E: Response time for Congruent 
and Incongruent presentations of the Best Friend/Weather condition. Mean RT 





With respect to the SMT, data for a single participant were removed for not following 
task instructions to a required level by failing to respond to a large number of clips. Rates of 
false-positives on the SMT recognition test were subtracted from correct responses to control 
for the effect of guessing, and overall proportional rates of correctly recognised clips were 
calculated. In order to understand the overall effect of mental rehearsal on recognition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with the species and description variables entered 
as two factors, with two levels each (Animal and Human and Not Described and Described 
respectively). Initial analyses revealed that mental rehearsal in the form of describing movie 
clips was found to significantly increase recognition for both human and animal videos, F(1, 
65) = 24.24, p < .001, ηp
2 = .272 (see Table 2.4 for all SMT descriptive statistics and Figure 
2.3 for initial SMT results), supporting the findings of Bird, Keidel, Ing, Horner, and Burgess 
(2015) regarding improved memory for complex event sequences. The split high and low 
usage-rate groups for both mental and physical language scores on the DAF task were then 




Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics for all SMT Variables. 
 
 
 Mean SD Range 
SMT not described animal .39 .23 .79 
SMT described animal .43 .19 .98 
SMT not described human .44 .20 .73 
SMT described human .53 .21 .85 
Note: SMT scores are proportional. 
 
Figure 2.3. SMT Rehearsal Effect. 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean proportion of correct responses for clips with and without mental 
rehearsal. Mean accuracy (proportion correct) is plotted on the y-axis. The ‘Not Described’ 




2.3.2. Relations between Friend Descriptions and Implicit Association Test Performance 
To control for multiple comparisons, a p value of < .002 was adopted for the 
following correlations. As shown in Table 2.5, neither mental nor physical description scores 
exhibited a relationship with IAT variables, (ps > .002, ns), therefore to further attempt to 
understand whether IAT performance varied with differences in the DAF task, we conducted 
a separate repeated measures ANOVA in which the six IAT conditions were the dependent 




Table 2.5. Correlation Coefficients for Relations between IAT Variables and Mind-Minded 







Self/best friend (congruent) .21 -.17 
Self/best friend (incongruent) .29 -.13 
Self/Lady Gaga (congruent) .21 -.12 
Self/Lady Gaga (incongruent) .33 -.01 
Self/weather (congruent) .14 -.10 
Self/weather (incongruent) .19 -.16 
Best friend/Lady Gaga (congruent) .14 -.11 
Best friend/Lady Gaga (incongruent) .16 -.09 
Best friend/weather (congruent) .03 -.06 
Best friend/weather (incongruent) .11 -.04 
Lady Gaga/weather (congruent) .20 .00 
Lady Gaga/weather (incongruent) .21 -.04 
* p < .002 (adjusted alpha level) 
Note: DAF = Describe a Friend. 
 
For the following analysis, a p value of < .008 was adopted to control for multiple 
comparisons across IAT variables. The high and low groups for both mind-minded and 
physical descriptions on the DAF task were added as between participant independent 
variables (see Table 2.6). At this stage the analysis yielded no significant relations between 
the six conditions of the IAT and levels of mind-minded or physical descriptions, regardless 
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2.3.3. Relations between Friend Descriptions and Silent Movies Task Performance 
Initial bivariate correlations did not reveal significant relations between variables in 
the SMT and mind-minded or physical descriptions of friends (ps > .05, ns; see Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7. Correlation Coefficients for Relations between SMT Variables and Mind-Minded 






Not Described Animal -.19 -.05 
Described Animal -.06 -.15 
Not Described Human .05 .05 
Described Human -.13 -.01 
* p < .008 (adjusted alpha level) 
Note: DAF = Describe a Friend. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed with two variables: ‘Species’ and 
‘Description’. Each variable had two levels: Species denoted movie clips portraying either 
animal or human videos, Description denoted either movie clips that had not been previously 
rehearsed or movie clips that had been previously rehearsed. The high and low groups for 
both mind-minded and physical descriptions on the DAF task were added as between 
participant independent variables (see Table 2.8). Analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of Species on physical descriptions, F(1, 65) = 4.11, p = .047, ηp
2 = .060, with participants 
scoring higher for physical descriptions demonstrating increased recognition for human 
clips. A significant two-way interaction was also observed between high/low Species and 
Description on mind- minded descriptions, F(1, 65) = 4.25 p = .043, ηp




in the high group for mind-minded descriptions demonstrated increased recognition for 
human videos which had not been rehearsed compared to individuals in the low group for 
mind-mindedness. The difference score between human and animal movie clips was 
calculated by deducting mean proportional scores of correctly remembered animal videos 
from mean proportional scores of correctly remembered human videos, in order to assist 
with the further visualization of the main effect of physical language use on human and 
animal scores, and the interaction between mental language use, opportunity for rehearsal 
and human and animal scores (see Figure 2.4 for results of the comparisons between DAF 
task friend descriptions and SMT performance). 
 








SMT not described animal .43 (.24) .35 (.22) 
SMT described animal .44 (.19) .42 (.19) 
SMT not describe human .45 (.18) .45 (.22) 




Figure 2.4. SMT Mental and Physical Language Use. 
 
Figure 2.4. A: Mean difference score between Human and Animal clips at both high and low 
levels of the physical language use group. Mean difference is plotted on the y-axis. Low and 
high levels of physical language use are plotted left-to-right on the x-axis. B: Mean difference 
score between Human and Animal clips for rehearsed and non- rehearsed clips at both low 
and high levels of the mind-minded description group. Mean difference is plotted on the y-
axis. Low and high levels of mind-minded description are plotted left-to-right on the x-axis. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
The results of the current study overall highlight a link between how we think about 
personally familiar people and how we retrieve and use social information from memory. No 
relationship was observed between mental language use and implicit attitudes assessed with 
the IAT. We found that people who described their friend in physical terms showed an 
overall bias for memory for human rather than animal videos. We also observed that people 
who described their friend in mental terms were more proficient at correctly remembering 
video clips portraying humans when no opportunity for rehearsal was given. 
Initial correlation analysis of the DAF task sample revealed that people who referred 




recent literature suggests that greater levels of self-referencing during encoding enhances 
recollection memory for physical objects (Durbin, Mitchell & Johnson, 2017). Therefore, it is 
possible that individuals more likely to describe their friends in self-referential terms would 
also be more likely to describe their physical qualities with reference to themselves, or their 
own attitudes as opposed to generally stating or listing physical traits. For example, during 
the coding process of the DAF task, a remark referring to a physical quality about a friend 
such as ‘He has blonde hair’ would be coded as an incidence of physical language use. A 
remark such as ‘His hair is lighter than mine’, however, would be coded as an incidence of 
self-reference. In this way, it is possible that individuals more prone to self-referencing in the 
DAF task would also be more likely to describe physical traits or characteristics in this way. 
Correlation analysis for the DAF task also revealed a negative relationship between 
referring to the nature of the relationship between participants and their friends and referring 
to the behaviour of friends. Research conducted by Beike, Cole and Merrick (2017) 
investigating the effect of psychological closeness in relationships on memory suggests that 
as closeness increases in a relationship, we are more likely to remember events as shared 
‘We’ memories; in which the shared nature of an event is emphasised in memory. Therefore, 
participants more likely to make statements about the nature and dynamic of their 
relationship with their best friend may be demonstrating this heightened sense of 
psychological closeness with heightened reference to such ‘We’ memories; being more likely 
to make relationship statements emphasising the shared ‘We play football’ as-opposed to the 
behavioural statement ‘She plays football’, for example. 
In general, correlation analysis did not reveal any significant relationships between 
mental or physical language use on the DAF and IAT/SMT variables. These findings 
corroborate with subsequent analyses performed on IAT data, however they do not 
correspond with findings regarding the SMT. It could be the case that the relationship 




non-linear one. Due to the fact that our DAF mental and physical language responses were 
not normally distributed, it is possible a threshold of mind-mindedness exists at which greater 
facilitation of the social memory skills utilised during the SMT occurs, better captured by 
subsequent ANOVA. 
Our initial IAT analysis revealed that for five out of the six comparisons of 
congruent/incongruent trials, as hypothesised congruent trials yielded significantly quicker 
RTs compared to incongruent trials. Associating mental words to the self and physical traits 
to a best friend were significantly faster than the inverse. This effect could potentially be 
explained by the phenomenon known as ‘Emotional Egocentricity Bias’ (EEB; Riva, 
Triscoli, Lamm, Carnaghi & Silani, 2016), in which individuals are more likely to focus on 
their own mental states, and emotional and mental content related to the self. This effect 
occurs naturally throughout the lifespan, but is most often predominantly expressed in 
childhood (Begeer et al., 2016). Quicker congruent trials were also seen for comparisons 
between the self and a personally unknown other (Lady Gaga), the self and weather, and a 
personally known (best friend) and unknown (Lady Gaga) other. These findings therefore 
suggest that for five of the six comparisons, semantic associations during congruent trials 
were more readily facilitated. As hoped for, these initial findings also echo the relational 
gradient of mind-mindedness revealed by Meins et al. (2014), with spontaneous mental state 
language use occurring with most frequency in close relationships, such as with a best friend 
or known other, compared to an unknown other. These finding also corresponds with Meins’ 
et al. (2014) observation that mental state language use occurs in greater frequency when 
referencing a living being (a personally unknown other) compared to a non-living object (a 
work of art). In all, initial IAT findings draw an interesting parallel with the relational aspects 
of mind-mindedness and how our social cognition facilitates thinking about the mental states 
of people we interact closely with. 




rate of correct responses during the recognition task, supporting the findings of Bird, Keidel, 
Ing, Horner, and Burgess (2015) that given time to recall events helps consolidate the 
memory of that event as a narrative. One potential limitation of the SMT design opens an 
interesting avenue for future research in that participants were given an allotted time to recall 
and note down details of a subset of the clips they had seen. Coding techniques employed in 
the DAF task could be applied to these data in future studies to examine whether a 
relationship exists between participants’ later performance in the recognition task and the 
manner in which they constructed narratives about the video clips observed during rehearsal. 
One aim of the present study was, during analyses comparing IAT results and mental 
language use on the DAF, whether in a manner according with the findings of Mitchell, 
Banaji and Macrae (2005), mind-mindedness depended on social cognitive processes distinct 
from general attitudinal components and whether these processes influenced semantic 
associations along a hypothesised gradient of relational closeness. We observed no 
relationship between the proportional use of mental language on the DAF task and any of the 
IAT categories. The tendency to spontaneously fixate to a greater or lesser extent on mental 
features had no significant effect on the way in which mental features are automatically 
semantically associated with other people of varying degrees of closeness. This suggests that 
mind-mindedness does not possesses an attitudinal component, as mind- mindedness appears 
to arise from memories of specific interactions rather than being a symptom of a general 
conceptual association bias in favour of mental descriptions of others.  
It is possible that the failure to reveal any significant relationship between mental 
language use and RTs in the IAT may be a reflection of task design. Initial paired-samples t-
tests did not reveal, as hypothesised, that every comparison pair was successfully and 
significantly assorted into a ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ condition; with no distinction 
with regard to RTs when associating words with an unknown other (Lady Gaga) or the 




subsequent analyses, the nature of the experimental design for the IAT was too simplistic to 
capture more complex and subtle effects involved in social cognition, and it may be the case 
that more effective designs capturing a gradient of relational closeness are needed to further 
investigate the attitudinal components of mind-mindedness. Taken together however, these 
findings highlight the importance of shared interactions with others, and the memory of these 
interactions in giving rise to mind-mindedness, supporting previous observations indicating 
that mind-mindedness is a quality of close relationships (Meins et al., 2014). 
Also of interest is that when comparing DAF and SMT results, we observed that 
individuals more likely to use physical language during their DAF descriptions also showed 
an overall advantage for recognising video clips portraying humans. Previous studies have 
shown that a strong mental imagery results in a more effective visual working memory 
(Keogh & Pearson, 2011), therefore it is possible that individuals who focus on physical 
features and characteristics are more effective at recalling various visual cues portrayed in the 
human clips, such as distinct faces, outfits, props, and tools. 
Finally, we found that as hypothesised, more mind-minded individuals, whose 
descriptions of their friends focused on their mental and emotional characteristics, showed 
a subtle bias towards the retrieval of social information from memory, resulting in better 
recognition for human clips. However, contrary to expectations, this effect was only 
observed in the absence of an opportunity for mental rehearsal. Whereas low mind-minded 
individuals remembered social videos better if they subsequently described them, 
individuals high on mind-mindedness tended to remember social videos well regardless of 
whether they had described them. Individuals low on mind-mindedness showed a pattern of 
retrieval from memory that suggests that, although they can gain a memorial benefit from 
the narrative structure of social interactions, they are less proficient at encoding this 
information ‘in the moment’, without the opportunity for rehearsal.  




higher for mind-mindedness have experienced some process of implicit social learning 
whereby they a drawn towards interpreting relevant social phenomena and cues in terms of 
mental states. The process by which participants demonstrating greater use of mental state 
language on the DAF task may be determined by a form of social learning that causes 
spontaneous or automatic processing of social information that participants are not aware of 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The finding that higher levels of mind-mindedness was 
associated with proficiency at encoding social cues in social interactions when denied the 
opportunity for mental rehearsal is perhaps telling, as it demonstrates an unconscious bias 
towards focus on socially-relevant information when forming narratives about events.  
Without any explicit instruction of what information in the viewed clips to attend to, 
and with no prior knowledge of an upcoming test of recognition for the video clips, more 
mind-minded participants demonstrated a spontaneous bias towards the encoding of social 
information as they viewed the clips, which was subsequently more readily available for 
retrieval when participants were asked to perform an explicit measure of memory for the 
video clips. This interpretation would accord with the view of Amodio and Ratner (2011), 
who suggested that implicitly-learned associations with certain social signals can influence 
the memories we form about events. This type of implicit learning may in part explain why 
mind-minded individuals demonstrate an unconscious bias towards focus on mental states 
when trying to interpret the behaviour of other people. 
One alternate possibility is that mind-minded individuals were also for some reason 
better at recognising the objects portrayed in the human video clips. However, when we 
consider mind-mindedness is a tendency towards focus on mental states (Meins, 1997). the 
finding that heightened mental state language use was related to better proficiency in 
memory for clips portraying human interactions, along with the relative ‘richness’ of 
relatable social interactions contained in the human video clips compared to the animal 




social information when observing interactions. Altogether, we find that greater levels of 
mind-mindedness appear to be related to an increased proficiency for memory of social 
information. It is possible that this is because mind-mindedness assists in directing the 
schemata we utilise to describe and interpret social interactions (Kuethe, 1962) and this 
process was spontaneously enacted when mind-minded individuals watched films 
containing people. 
2.5. Conclusions 
Taken together, the results of our study provide evidence that mind-mindedness is 
linked to the way we represent other people in episodic memory. One intriguing implication 
of our findings is the potential role that social narratives play in explaining the increased 
attention to the mental lives of others that is characteristic of mind-mindedness. In our study, 
asking participants to describe a film clip led to a strong increase in memory for the clips, a 
manipulation that is thought to help structure information in memory as a narrative structure 
that endures for several weeks (Bird et al., 2015). Participants who were more mind-minded 
on the DAF task however, demonstrated increased proficiency for recognising clips rich in 
social cues without the opportunity for rehearsal. In this context, it is therefore possible that 
mind-minded individuals show enhanced social memory because they are more likely to 
represent social interactions in terms of a coherent narrative. Participants who exhibited 
greater mind-mindedness on the DAF task were also more likely to encode social information 
when viewing social interactions portrayed in video clips. It is possible to speculate that such 
implicit behaviours are acquired from previous social interactions and experiences in the 
manner suggested by Amodio and Ratner (2011), subsequently interacting with memory 
processes and influencing the manner in which we construct narratives about social 
interactions in memory. Neuroimaging studies have shown that the creation of narratives aids 
memory by activation within the DMN (Bird et al., 2015), a large- scale network that is also 




evidence that social cognitive and memory processes may share the same neural substrate. 
Future work should focus on further examination of the link between mind-mindedness and 
memory. Namely, various forms of memory process should be compared against variance in 
levels of mind-mindedness in order to determine whether the construct shows a relationship 
with overall memory capacity or is specifically linked to a specific form of memory, i.e. 
episodic memory (Tulving, 1972), given the revealed link between mind-mindedness as 
recall for social events. Establishing such a link would serve as an important step in 






Study 2: Mind-Mindedness, Memory and Psychological Wellbeing 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The capacity to make sense of other people’s behaviour is an essential aspect of 
human cognition that depends on a complex set of underlying component processes and has 
broad implications for wellbeing. When we interact in a meaningful way with other people, 
we rely on information from memory when attempting to form an understanding of others’ 
behaviour in the present moment (Higgins, 2000). Numerous sources of behavioural evidence 
support the notion that memory exerts a substantial influence on social cognition. For 
example, early research into the effects of stereotypes and heuristic processing undertaken by 
Macrae and Shepherd (1989) had participants listen to a number of incidents of criminal 
transgression, and demonstrated that providing stereotypically-consistent information about 
the purported criminal significantly influenced participants’ tendency to judge that the 
suspect was involved in the crime. Providing this information also influenced recall of the 
incident details, with greater levels of recall for detail given about the crime committed. 
Further work undertaken by Macrae, Hewstone, and Griffiths (1993) found that during 
incidences of high task demand/high cognitive load, recall for stereotypically-consistent 
information is enhanced. Such findings demonstrate the way in which ‘fast-acting’ heuristic 
judgements based on social preconception may affect more long-term memory processes. 
More recent work undertaken by Ciaramelli, Bernardi and Moscovitch (2013) found 
that memory of an individual’s past experiences modulates their subsequent empathic 
responses. By providing participants with background information on the lives of two 
fictional characters, one having experienced a series of love/relationship-related failures and 
the other having experienced work-related failures, and requiring participants to appraise the 




individual who had experienced a troubled love-life, demonstrating an inverse tendency for 
memory to influence social judgements. Schacter (1996) has highlighted that memories are 
constructed from fragments of information distributed across different brain regions, 
depending on influences operating in the present as well as the past. Accordingly, an 
influence on one of the many disparate brain regions involved in memory encoding and 
retrieval may cause lasting long- term outcomes for memory processing. Davidson, Drouin, 
Kwan, Moscovitch and Rosenbaum (2012), for example, have reported that amnesic patients 
are less likely to maintain close social relationships, giving further evidence in support of 
the close relationship between memory function and wider social-cognitive processes. 
Neuroscientific evidence also demonstrates a large amount of shared neural circuitry 
between memory processes and social cognition. Mars et al. (2012) demonstrated a large 
degree of functional overlap between the Default Mode Network (DMN) and regions known 
to play an important role in socio-cognitive processing, including the posterior cingulate 
cortex (pCC), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the left and right angular gyri (ANG). 
Consistent with a relation between memory and social processing, regions in the DMN, 
including the pCC, are associated with the consolidation of event narratives in memory. Bird 
et al. (2015) demonstrated that the pCC is recruited during the rehearsal of narratives for 
complex event sequences, such as social interactions. Recent evidence also suggests that 
there exist distinct patterns of neural recruitment depending on whether we are processing 
information related to ourselves or other people. For example, de Caso, Poerio, Jefferies, and 
Smallwood (2017) had participants undergo a self-reference task where a list of adjectives 
associated with either the self, a known other, or a nonsense syllable control condition was 
memorised and later recalled after delay. An increase in observed levels of functional 
connectivity between the frontoparietal network (FPN) and the hippocampus in the resting 





These findings indicate that distinct neural pathways may support memory processes 
that are important for social-cognition. These lines of evidence from the fields of psychology 
and neuroscience together suggest that social cognition depends in part on memories based 
on information learned about others through prior social interactions, allowing the intentions 
and motivations of other people to be better understood. Much of this episodic knowledge is 
automatically retrieved, not requiring conscious effort or deliberation (Jacoby, 1991), and 
effective functioning of this retrieval system is essential for making the fast, on-the-spot 
calculations necessary for interpreting the social behaviour of others. 
Social cognitive processing also has important links to overall wellbeing. Deficits in 
social cognitive and memory function are a feature of many psychiatric disorders such as 
social anxiety disorder (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), autism spectrum 
disorders (Senju, 2013), and depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999; Riskind, Castellon, & 
Beck, 1989). Frith (1994) provided key evidence linking autism spectrum disorders (ASD) 
with an inability to represent the internal mental states of others, noting that ASD individuals 
demonstrate significant impairment during false-belief tasks (a task requiring the ability to 
view a situation from the perspective of another individual), with difficulty on false-belief 
tasks being associated with a more general difficulty in interpreting the thoughts and 
intentions of other people in day-to- day life. More recently, Senju (2013) noted that while 
individuals with ASD typically demonstrate impairment in the development of social 
interaction and communication, some ‘high-functioning’ ASD individuals showed a 
relatively unimpaired ability to process social information in a controlled experimental 
setting. In contrast, these high-functioning ASD individuals demonstrated consistent 
impairment in social interaction in daily life and accordingly struggled with spontaneous or 
non-explicit aspects of social cognition. 
Deficits in social cognition are also observed in other psychiatric disorders. For 




al., 2007), which has functional consequences for social competency and episodic memory 
encoding (Kim & Mundy, 2012). Similarly, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) is linked to deficits in social skills that arise due to an inability to attend to 
appropriate social cues (Kofler, Rapport, Bolden, Sarver, Raiker, & Alderson, 2011). In 
addition, various aspects of wellbeing and depressive symptoms are also negatively related to 
social cognition, and may explain associated problems in interpreting the emotional and 
mental states of others (Weightman, Air, & Baune, 2014). Berman et al. (2011) have shown a 
tendency towards rumination, or cyclic, repetitive thinking when confronted with a negative 
social experience or stressor. Kashdan and Roberts (2007) found rumination to be associated 
with heightened levels of social anxiety, concluding that while rumination may begin as a 
short-term coping strategy by replaying events from a previous interaction, it may exacerbate 
maladaptive thought-patterns in socially anxious individuals, further impairing the overall 
ability and willingness to interact socially with others. Although rumination is often 
associated with negative thought-content, it is fundamentally characterised by a heightened 
level of focus on the perceived causes of one’s affective state (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008). Rumination appears to serve as a strategy for emotion regulation 
(Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, Smith, & Harvey, 2011), however rumination may also enhance 
or amplify negative emotional states through causing the surrounding events to be 
indefinitely mentally replayed. In the context of social cognition, maladaptive ruminative 
tendencies can therefore lead to increased emphasis placed on negative aspects of our 
memories of social experiences and interactions. 
Depressive symptoms also have adverse links with social cognition, linked to 
problems interpreting the emotional and mental states of others (Weightman et al., 2014). 
Berman et al. (2011) have also linked depression to a tendency towards rumination, or 
cyclic, repetitive thinking on negative or worrisome subjects. Rumination has been found 




which may lead towards impairment in the overall ability and willingness to interact 
socially with others without an effective coping strategy. Depression and its related 
patterns of thinking, therefore, may exert a significant negative influence on the social-
developmental trajectory of an individual through causing negative association with 
social interaction and fixating on aspects of social interactions that may prevent us from 
making accurate judgements about the mental states of others. 
Various social and environmental indicators also effect individual assessments 
about their overall quality of life and are predictive of a variety of social-developmental 
and wellbeing outcomes. Lim, Gleeson, Jackson and Fernandez (2014) observed that an 
individuals who reported overall higher levels of quality of life, and maintained a greater 
number of close social relationships possess an enhanced buffer against psychological 
distress. Various socio-economic and ecological factors also influence an individuals’ 
overall quality of life, including income, social practices, crime and living environment 
(Hajduová, Andrejovský & Beslerová, 2014), leading to a variety of physical 
(Truthmann et al., 2017) and psychological (Postrado & Lehman ,1995) health outcomes. 
The presence of psychological and physical health issues in-turn may also influence the 
number of positive social interactions we partake in, and thus possess an overall 
influence on quality of life (Yanos, Rosenfield & Horwitz, 2001; Lyons, Sullivan Ritvo 
& Coyne, 1995). 
Many measures of clinical and wellbeing outcomes also serve as indicators of 
memory deficits. Cognitive processes influencing the shifting and maintenance of 
attention, for example, may often lead to difficulty encoding information to memory. 
Individuals with ADHD represent a group with a severe deficit in working memory, 
attributed to impairment in frontal lobe functioning resulting in difficulty with sustained 
periods of attentiveness (Klingberg, Forssberg & Westerberg, 2002). Bolden, Rapport, 




rehearsal for ADHD individuals. Deficits in attention and memory are of course not 
restricted to individuals with ADHD and may also result from more general maladaptive 
cognitive processes. Bigelsen, Lehrfeld, Jopp and Somer (2016) suggested that 
daydreaming, a common feature of everyday cognition, can occasionally possess 
maladaptive properties resulting in attention deficit. Various physical and psychological 
conditions therefore may have a bearing on attentional processes and subsequently 
possess predictive outcomes for memory function. Higher levels of mindful attention 
have also been demonstrated to correlate with enhanced performance on tasks of working 
memory (Morrison & Jha, 2015), further revealing the importance of attention in 
allowing us to retain information in memory. 
Various other psychological health issues such as depression and anxiety have 
also been associated with negative consequences for memory. Brand, Jolles and Gispen-
de Wied (1992) observed that depressed individuals displayed deficits in both recall and 
recognition memory when compared to controls. Reidy (2004) also identified a link 
between higher self-reporting scores for trait depression and trait anxiety (traits 
exhibiting a high degree of comorbidity, Wu & Fang, 2014) and deficits in memory 
recall ability. More recent work by Yao, Chen and Qian (2018) also associates greater 
levels of trait anxiety with deficits in visual working memory. Many such psychological 
health issues can also interact with chronic physical conditions, such as stress, which 
may also further contribute towards deficits in working memory (Morgan, Doran, 
Steffian, Hazlett & Southwick, 2006).  
The present study is a large-scale individual difference study aimed at exploring the 
correlates of a specific aspect of social cognition: mind-mindedness (Meins, 1997). Mind- 
mindedness is a construct characterized by a tendency spontaneously to invoke internal states 
during social interactions or when recalling details of another person (Meins, Fernyhough, 




exemplifies an aspect of social cognition that encapsulates a dependence on memory 
processes and spontaneous thought. Wide variations in individuals’ tendency to describe 
significant others in mind-minded ways have been reported across a range of relationships: 
mothers’ descriptions of their children (e.g., Meins et al., 1998), adoptive parents’ and foster 
carers’ descriptions of their adopted and foster children (Fishburn et al., 2017), adults’ 
descriptions of close friends and romantic partners (Meins, Harris-Waller & Lloyd, 2008; 
Meins, Fernyhough, & Harris-Waller, 2014), children’s descriptions of best friends (Davis, 
Meins, & Fernyhough, 2014; Meins et al., 2006). Mind-mindedness is thought to be a quality 
of close relationships rather than a trait (Meins et al., 2014), since it is most prevalent when 
describing personally familiar individuals, and mind-minded descriptions of significant others 
are unrelated to mind-minded descriptions of famous figures or works of art (Hill & 
McMahon, 2016; Meins et al., 2014). 
Attempts to establish why some individuals are more mind-minded than others have 
largely drawn null findings. Studies focusing on caregivers’ descriptions of their children 
have shown that there are no clear associations between mind-mindedness and caregiver SES, 
educational level, or occupational status (Fishburn et al., 2017; Lundy, 2013; Meins et al., 
1998). Mind-mindedness has also been shown to be unrelated to depression in parents 
(Walker, Wheatcroft, & Camic, 2011) despite the debilitating effects of depression on 
multiple related components of social cognition, although mind-mindedness is lower in 
mothers hospitalised for severe mental illness compared with psychologically healthy 
controls (Schacht et al., 2017). Research has also shown that mind-mindedness is unrelated to 
ToM abilities both in childhood (Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson & Lidstone, 2006) and 
adulthood (Barreto, et al., 2016; Devine & Hughes, 2017). This suggests that ToM abilities 
are necessary but not sufficient for mind-mindedness, and that a distinction can be made 
between having the capacity to understand others’ internal states and the tendency 




2012; Meins et al., 2006).  
Study 2 aims to assess the extent to which mind-mindedness relates to various 
components of social cognition—memory, attention, and spontaneous thought—and clinical 
measures that have been shown to influence these cognitive components of social cognition. 
To this end, the present study assessed mind-mindedness by requiring participants to provide 
open-ended descriptions of a close friend (Meins et al., 2008, 2014). We then examined 
whether variation in this score was related to individual differences in measures of memory. 
We also examined the relation of mind-mindedness to various measures of wellbeing and 
personality traits that have developmental outcomes for aspects of social cognition and 
memory, and therefore may be hypothesised to relate to mind-mindedness through effecting 
one or more of its component processes. 
We compared performance on measures of memory in the form of a paired 
associates task (Karantzoulis, Scorpio, Borod, & Bender, 2011) as a means to assess whether 
measures of overall memory capacity in a context not explicitly socially-related may link 
with mind- mindedness. If the research carried-out by Meins et al. (2014) suggests that 
mind-mindedness is a relational construct, dependent on the closeness of a relationship we 
have with another person, then there is no reason to expect it would be related to a general 
memory capacity (i.e. declarative memory for objects or categorized information). 
Furthermore, if the earlier work of Meins (1997) also suggests that mind-mindedness is a 
tendency to spontaneously mentalise, or recruit and utilise ToM, in representing or 
interacting with others through spontaneously attending to mental states, then we have 
reason to suspect that it involves some process where the closeness of a relationship 
increases the frequency at which one spontaneously attends to mental state cues in social 
interactions and again, would show no relationship with general memory capacity, such as 
that captured by the paired associates task. 




measures of incidental memory that arise through the process of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
referencing during recognition using a self-reference task (de Caso et al., 2017). The self-
reference task employed allows for the comparison of variation in levels of mind-
mindedness along a relational gradient in a manner similar to that employed by Meins et al. 
(2014). The three conditions of comparison along this gradient consist of associations with 
the self, associations with a personally unknown other (Lady Gaga) and a control 
comparison requiring the counting of syllables. Together, these three conditions allow for 
assessment of recognition memory for words encoded with reference to the self, and more 
general declarative memory for judgements about a personally unknown famous figure and 
semantic memory pertaining to making judgements about the number of syllables in a word. 
Memory appears to function as a component process of mind-mindedness. The nature 
of mind-mindedness arising from close relationships involving personal interactions (Meins 
et al. 2014) appears to underline the necessary prerequisite of having a well of episodic 
memories of shared experiences with another individual to draw-upon in order to predict 
assign and infer mental states. The previous findings of study 1 also revealed a link between 
greater levels of mind-mindedness and increased proficiency for encoding observed social 
interactions into memory. However, further testing is needed in order to help fully determine 
whether mind-mindedness is specifically dependent upon episodic memories of shared 
interactions with close others.  
Previous work by Mitchell, Banaji and Macrae (2005) has revealed distinct neural 
activations, implicated in social cognitive measures and mentalisation, when judging 
psychological states about others or when making judgements about general social categories 
of people (Contreras, Benaji and Mitchell, 2012). Moran, Jolly and Mitchell (2014) also 
noted that when describing the behaviour of other people in general, a tendency to 
overemphasize underlying dispositions and personality traits often exists, known as the 




factors on human relationships regardless of closeness, it becomes necessary to distinguish 
whether mind-mindedness might arise specifically from episodic memories of close and/or 
ongoing personal interactions with others, or general attributions of mental states to others, 
arising for example through access to a greater depth and variety of declarative memory and 
general knowledge about another person, including information that might pertain to their 
mental states (such as beliefs, preferences, etc.) and does not necessitate knowing them 
personally. 
Declarative memory is a term denoting the ability to bring to mind factual and 
episodic information (Paller, 2009). As such, it involves the encoding and retrieval of 
personal information and memories (episodic memory) and general knowledge (Cristofori & 
Levin, 2015), including semantic memory (Baddeley, 1995). The self-reference effect refers 
to the increased facilitation of information encoding into memory when it in some way 
pertains to the self (Bentley, Greenaway & Haslam, 2017). Accordingly, we should observe 
bias towards encoding of self-related words as-opposed to the encoding of the Lady Gaga and 
syllables condition in a standard SRT. Importantly, of the three association conditions, none 
of them assessed memory for word associations with individuals personally known to 
participants; possessing episodic memories of previous interactions together. 
Previous literature has shown mind-mindedness to be a relational construct, with 
greater levels of mind-mindedness being associated with closer relationships (Meins et al., 
2014), suggesting that it is in some way dependent on the frequency of personal interactions 
we have with others, and the memories we encode from them. The results of Study 1 also 
lend support to this finding by revealing a relationship between mind-mindedness and the 
facilitation of episodic memory encoding for social information. Mind-mindedness therefore 
appears to necessitate the drawing-upon of prior experiences and interactions had with 
another individual, in order to formulate and then utilise a mental model with which we 




should rely upon episodic memory as a fundamental subcomponent in order that previous 
interactions may be recalled and applied to a given, ongoing interaction. 
Studies investigating processes of implicit social learning have also demonstrated that 
our interpretations of social interactions may be in part formed by associations made outside 
of conscious awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Mitchell, Macrae and Banaji (2004) 
have argued that social interactions are inherently complex and accordingly require the 
integration of information from memory systems in order to attempt to understand the 
behaviour of others. Amodio and Ratner (2011) have suggested that implicit learning 
processes and memory systems interact in order to allow an efficient method of interpreting 
social contexts by forming automatic associations with certain social signals and previous 
similar experiences stored in episodic memory. The previous finding of Study 1, that 
participants demonstrating greater levels of mind-mindedness possessed an automatic bias 
towards the encoding of social information, suggests a degree of implicit behaviour resulting 
in a focus on socially-relevant information and mental states. 
Processes of implicit social learning have in fact been shown to facilitate an implicit 
focus on social cues and mental state information. Hudson, Nijboer and Jellema (2012) have 
previously demonstrated that the intentions and dispositions of other people can be learned 
implicitly from the reception of social cues in a manner that may help account for the implicit 
focus on mental states exemplified by mind-mindedness. Hudson et al. (2012) have also 
provided evidence that pro-social dispositions or social cues facilitate processes of implicit 
social learning. Accordingly, individuals may be more likely to attribute mental states to one-
another when they are engaged in close, emotionally positive relationships. These findings 
have interesting implications if we consider that heightened focus on mental states might be 
prevalent in closer relationships due to the repeated implicit social learning processes 
experienced from social cues we receive when interacting with other people. 




have for another individual is predictive of our ability to understand another person’s 
behavior using nonverbal social cues. Heerey and Velani (2010) had participants play a 
computerized game of rock-paper-scissors against an avatar they believed was another 
participant. On some occasions, the avatar generated a predictive facial cue before making a 
play. Participants demonstrated a significantly greater win frequency for trials in which they 
received a social cue, even if they did not acquire explicit knowledge of the predictive nature 
of the cue. The degree to which participants could successfully predict the behaviour of the 
avatar related to their self-reported level of liking for the avatar. These findings accord with 
those uncovered by Meins et al. (2014) in suggesting that spontaneous focus on mental states 
and social cues arises as a quality of close relationships. Considered together, it becomes 
reasonable to suggest that mind-mindedness may be exemplified in close relationships due to 
levels of personal familiarity and the number of shared experiences we have with another 
person, at once providing opportunity for the facilitation of implicit learning processes 
encouraging focus on mental states and providing a wealth of episodic memories of an 
individual to draw upon when interpreting their behaviour. 
Naturally then, it is possible to reasonably assume that contrary to the findings of 
Study 1, with mind-mindedness showing a relationship with the encoding of episodic 
social memories, in the current study, mind-mindedness would not possess any significant 
relationship with associations performed about ‘Lady Gaga’ in the self-reference task due 
to the lack of closeness in the ‘relationship’ between participants and Lady Gaga, and the 
absence of episodic memories of social interactions to draw upon to make judgements 
about a situation. Likewise, we would not expect any significant relationship between 
levels of mind-mindedness and associations involving the self or syllables; mind-
mindedness being a measure of social cognition. The SRT therefore will allow for the 
assessment of whether according to the findings of Meins et al. (2014) and of Study 1, 




episodic memories of previous social interactions, as-opposed to a general declarative and 
semantic memory capacity. 
We also examined the links between mind-mindedness with different elements of 
wellbeing. Although previous research has found no explicit link between mind-mindedness 
and depression, previous researchers have suggested that deficits in mental-language use may 
arise from symptoms exhibiting comorbidity with depression, such as stress (Walker et al., 
2011). Deficits in mental state talk have been observed in various clinical groups treated for 
mental illnesses (Schacht et al., 2017). However, little research so far has been performed on 
the relation of mental health and wellbeing to mind-mindedness in non-parent samples. 
We compared mind-mindedness against a variety of clinical measures that could be 
hypothesised to possess a relationship with mind-mindedness or one of its lower-order 
components. We included a measure of depression administered through the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD, Radloff, 1977). Although depression has 
various implications for social cognition and memory processes, previous research has 
shown no link between depression and frequency of mental state language use (Walker et 
al., 2011). Accordingly, no direct relationship between mind-mindedness and depression is 
hypothesised, although depression may still significantly correlate with other included 
variables, for example being associated with higher levels of anxiety and rumination, and 
thus indirectly influence other factors contributing towards mind-mindedness and social 
cognition in general. 
We also included clinical measures of trait anxiety from the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983) and ADHD from the Adult 
ADHD Self-Report Scale (Kessler et al., 2005) Due to them both influencing attentional 
processes and serving as negative predictors of working memory function (Yao, Chen and 
Qian, 2018; Klingberg, Forssberg & Westerberg, 2002) it is predicted that both trait anxiety 




they impair the function of an essential cognitive component of mind-mindedness. For the 
same reasons, we also include measures of mindful attention gathered from the Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003), hypothesising that if attending to and 
encoding cues is a fundamental aspect of mind-mindedness, as scores for levels of mindful 
attention increase so will scores for mind-mindedness. 
Further, we include questionnaire measures of autism from the ASQ (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) in order to assess whether the social-
cognitive ramifications of ASD symptoms exhibit a relationship with mind-mindedness in 
individuals. Due to deficiencies in the ability to mentalise associated with ASD (Senju, 
2013), it is predicted that levels of mind-mindedness will fall as total score on the ASQ rises. 
Among these clinical measures, we also finally include measures of rumination from the 
Rumination Response Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001) and daydreaming from the 
Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1965) in order to investigate the link 
between mind-mindedness, spontaneous thought, and social cognition.  
Ruby et al. (2013) have reported that social-cognition and memories about past 
interactions make up a significant portion of the content of spontaneous thinking, and 
emotional processing experiences also appear to be a common feature of mind- wandering 
(Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & Alloy, 2016) and rumination (Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, 
Smith, & Harvey, 2011). Furthermore, alexithymia, or an inability to accurately identify and 
articulate one’s own experienced emotions, has been shown to be related to attachment 
security, a strong correlate of mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 2008). Accordingly, the extent 
to which mind-mindedness is related to the mind-wandering experience in various forms 
related to social-cognitive processing such as rumination and daydreaming is also 
investigated, with the prediction that scores for daydreaming and rumination will increase 
for participants scoring higher for mind-mindedness.  




Quality of Life Instruments (WHOQOL, World Health Organisation, 1997). Among these 
included measures were quality of life, environmental wellbeing, social relationships, 
physical and psychological health. All of these variables have been shown to influence the 
nature and number of our social relationships (Hajduová, Andrejovský & Beslerová, 2014; 
Lim, Gleeson, Jackson & Fernandez, 2014; Yanos, Rosenfield & Horwitz, 2001) and overall 
perception of quality of life, which serves as a predictor of healthy social development. As 
each of these measures of wellbeing is associated in some way with positive outcomes for 
social development, it is predicted that higher scores for mind-mindedness will coincide with 
increased scores in each of the five measures of wellbeing assessed by the WHOQOL. 
Accordingly, this section of analysis aims to determine the extent to which mind-mindedness 
may be associated with various measures of psychosocial health and wellbeing that have 
outcome effects on social development in non-parent groups. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 157 individuals aged between 18 and 35 years (M = 20.28, SD = 
2.67). All participants were native English speakers. Participants were undergraduate students 
who were recruited via the Department’s online participant pool. Participants were paid £80 
or an equivalent worth of course credit for completing a battery of behavioural tasks (across a 
total of four sessions). The study was approved by the relevant University Ethics Committees 
and conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. All 
participants provided written informed consent. 
3.2.2. Materials and Methods 
Participants completed all sections of the study across four sessions, held on separate 
days over the course of one week. Participants completed a variety of behavioural tasks, each 
measuring variance in some form of higher-order cognitive function, with each session 




the administration of the three task batteries was counterbalanced across sessions. All 
behavioural measures were programmed and presented to participants using PsychoPy 
(Peirce, 2007, 2009). The study reported here specifically focuses on mind-mindedness data 
from the describe-a-friend task (Meins et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2008) and the questionnaire-
based and behavioural data listed below. 
3.2.2.1. Describe a Friend Task (DAF). 
Mind-Mindedness was assessed using the Describe a Friend (DAF) task (Meins et al., 
2014; Meins et al., 2008), administered via a computer. Participants were presented with a 
blank screen with the instruction to think of a specific close friend and type a description of 
the friend in the text box. The on-screen instructions informed participants that they could (a) 
include any information about their friend they thought was relevant, (b) make their response 
as long or as short as they wished, and (c) take as long as they wished, but aim to spend 
around five minutes on the task. Participant responses were later coded for mind-mindedness 
according to the Mind- Mindedness Coding Manual criteria (Meins & Fernyhough, 2015). 
The text was first divided into discreet descriptions that could be single words, phrases, or 
sentences. Each description was then placed it into one of the following exhaustive and 
exclusive categories: Mind- Minded, Behavioural, Physical, Self-referential, Relationship, 
and General, in the same manner as Study 1 (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.1). 
All descriptions were coded by a trained researcher who was blind to all other data, 
and a randomly selected 25% were coded by a second trained, blind researcher: inter-rater 
reliability was κ = .85. Participants received scores for each category as a percentage of the 
total number of descriptions produced in order to control for the amount written. Scores for 
mind-minded descriptions indexed participants’ mind-mindedness in relation to their close 
friends, and scores for physical descriptions were selected to index participants’ knowledge 
of their friends that did not emphasise internal states. 




The Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001) is a widely 
used measure of trait rumination initially designed to assess rumination as a response- 
behaviour towards stress. The scale is comprised of 22 items measured along two axes of 
reflection and brooding respectively. Reflection can be defined as greater degree of 
introspection during rumination, whereas brooding represents a more maladaptive aspect of 
rumination with stronger links to negative thinking and depression. Higher scores in either of 
these categories lead to an increase in trait-rumination (overall tendency to ruminate) score. 
Participants were instructed on-screen to rate how often they engaged in a variety of 
ruminative activities on a four-point Likert response scale, with responses consisting of ‘1- 
almost never’, ‘2 - sometimes’, ‘3 - often’, or ‘4 - almost always’. For example, a statement 
in the reflection subcategory might ask participants to indicate how often they ‘go away by 
yourself and think about why you feel this way’; a statement in the brooding category might 
ask participants to indicate how often they think “What am I doing to deserve this?” Possible 
scores on the test range from 22 (answering ‘1- almost never’ to every question) to 88 
(answering ‘4 – almost always’ to every question). Greater average scores between these two 
components denote a higher score for overall trait rumination. 
3.2.2.3. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory is a 40-item self-reporting questionnaire measuring 
levels of anxiety along two gradients of state and trait anxiety, with possible scores ranging 
from 40-160 and higher scores indicating greater levels of state or trait anxiety (Spielberger et 
al., 1983). State anxiety refers to more transitory states of unease, tension, and stress, whereas 
trait anxiety is defined as an enduring disposition towards worry and discomfort (Spielberger 
& Sydeman, 1994). Participants respond by indicating either the intensity of a number of 
state anxiety-related items (‘not at all’, ‘somewhat, ‘moderately so’, ‘very much so’), or the 
frequency with which they experience various trait anxiety-related items (‘almost never’, 




Somewhat’, ‘3 – Moderately’,’ 4- Very Much’). Items assessing state anxiety consist of 
statements such as ‘I feel upset’ or ‘I feel at ease’. Items assessing trait anxiety consist of 
statements such as ‘I lack self-confidence’ or ‘I have disturbing thoughts’. The possible range 
of scores for both categories of state and trait anxiety respectively is 20-80. 
3.2.2.4. Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD). 
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977) consists of a 
short self-report-style questionnaire of 20 items assessing the frequency at which a variety of 
depressive symptoms have been experienced by an individual during the past week. Possible 
responses range between ‘not at all’, ‘a little’, ‘some’ and ‘a lot’. Items consisted of 
statements such as ‘I was depressed’ or ‘I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing’. 
Possible scores ranged from 0-60, with higher scores indicating greater frequency of 
occurrence for depressive symptoms. 
3.2.2.5. Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ). 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001) is a questionnaire consisting of 50 items assessing the extent to which 
individuals exhibit symptoms associated with autism and the wider autistic spectrum. 
Participants respond to items according to a forced-choice format ranging between ‘definitely 
agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ and ‘definitely disagree’. Items cover five domains 
associated with the autistic spectrum: communication, social skills, imagination, attention to 
detail, and attention switching/tolerance of change. Items consisted of statements such as 
‘When I talk on the phone, I am not sure when it is my turn to speak’ or ‘I find social 
situations easy’. A total ASQ score was calculated as an average of scores in the five 
categories for us in subsequent analysis. Scores for the questionnaire range from 50-200. 
Higher scores indicate a higher autism spectrum quotient (ASQ). 
3.2.2.6. Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS). 




with the World Health Organisation, consists of 18 questions consistent with DSM-IV criteria 
for symptoms of ADHD in adults. Participants indicate the frequency with which they 
experience a number of symptoms associated with ADHD along a Likert scale: ‘never’, 
‘rarely’, ‘sometimes’, ‘often’, and ‘very often’. More positive responses are associated with 
greater frequency of ADHD symptoms. Items consist of statements such as ‘how often do 
you have difficulty wrapping-up the final parts of a project, even though the challenging parts 
are done?’ or ‘when you have a task that requires a lot of thought, how often do you avoid or 
delay getting started?’ Scores on the questionnaire range from 18-90, with higher scores 
indicating greater severity of ADHD symptoms. 
3.2.2.7. Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI). 
The Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1965) assesses the frequency 
of occurrence of daydreaming and night-dreaming. It further grades these occurrences along 
three dimensions: how pleasant they are, how unpleasant/frightening they are, and how vivid 
they are. It consists of two parts; in part A participants respond to one of five possible 
answers in a forced-choice manner for each item (for a total of 24 items). Items consist of 
statements such as ‘I am awakened with the realization I have been dreaming’ or ‘When I 
have time on my hands I daydream’. Part B is longer, consisting of 319 items, participants 
respond to items along a Likert scale ranging between ‘definitely not true’, ‘usually not true’, 
‘usually true’, and ‘very true/strongly characteristic of me’. Items in part B consist of 
statements such as ‘My mind seldom wanders while I am working’ or ‘If something is really 
on my mind I brood on it for hours on end’. Scores for daydreaming and not night-dreaming 
are included in analyses for the purposes of this study. After calculating scores for both parts, 
overall score (ranging from 344 to 1720) is calculated for daydreaming, with higher scores 
indicating greater frequency and intensity of daydreaming. 
3.2.2.8. Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). 




awareness, or attention to what is taking place in the present moment, a quality of 
consciousness predictive of a variety of self-regulation and wellbeing constructs. Participants 
indicate the frequency that they experience a range of related states of awareness using a 
Likert scale response system ranging between ‘almost always’, ‘very frequently’, ‘somewhat 
frequently’, ‘somewhat infrequently’, ‘very infrequently’, and ‘almost never’. Scores on the 
questionnaire range from 15-90. Examples of statements responded to include ‘I could be 
experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until some-time later’ or ‘I do jobs or 
tasks automatically, without being aware of what I’m doing’. Higher scores indicate greater 
levels of mindful attention. 
3.2.2.9. World Health Organisation Quality of Life Instruments (WHOQOL-100). 
The World Health Organisation Quality of Life Instruments (World Health 
Organisation, 1997) consist of 100 items assessing overall quality of life across 5 domains: 
quality of life and general health, physical health, psychological health, social relationships, 
and environmental wellbeing. Participants respond to each item by indicating on a 5-point 
Likert scale either how frequently they have worried about their overall health over the last 
two weeks (an item example being ‘do you worry about your pain or discomfort?’), or how 
frequently they have experienced negative emotions/consequences of poor quality of life 
over the last two weeks (an item example being ‘how much do you enjoy life?’). Items 
consisted of statements such as ‘I was depressed’ or ‘I had trouble keeping my mind on what 
I was doing’. Higher scores across the 5 domains denote better overall quality of life. No 
total score is calculated for the questionnaire overall, with answers to each domain of 
experience being considered separately. 
3.2.2.10. Paired Associates Task (PA). 
The Paired Associates Task measures a system of paired-associates learning (PAL; 
Karantzoulis et al., 2011) in which items are matched together so that the presentation of one 




memory. These tasks are divided into the following: visual–visual, verbal–verbal, and visual– 
verbal. For the purposes of the present study, the visual–visual and visual–verbal conditions 
were not included and participants were assessed within the verbal–verbal condition. In the 
verbal–verbal condition, the matched pairs are verbally presented (e.g., listening to the word 
‘hat’ followed by the word ‘cushion’). The task was administered over two experimental 
sessions (lasting around 8 minutes respectively), taking place on different days. The first 
session featured an initial association encoding phase and an immediate recall phase, the 
second session featured a delayed recall phase. Mean levels of accuracy and response time 
during the delayed recall session were measured and compared across participants for use in 
subsequent analysis. 
3.2.2.11. Self-Reference Task (SRT). 
The Self-Reference Task measures the self-reference memory advantage across three 
conditions (de Caso et al., 2017) and involves an evaluation and a retrieval phase. The 
evaluation phase consists of two social conditions and one syllable count condition. In the 
social conditions, participants were asked to make decisions about associations between 
adjectives and one of two referents (‘Self’ or ‘Lady Gaga’). In the syllable condition, 
participants indicated via a button press whether the word on-screen had less than three or 
three or more syllables. All words were selected from a pool of normalised personality trait 
adjectives with meaningfulness and likeability ratings (Anderson, 1968). An equal number of 
positive, negative, and neutral adjectives (40 adjectives/valence) with the highest 
meaningfulness ratings were used. Adjectives were presented sequentially on-screen and 
participants indicated whether each adjective applied to a referent or had three or more 
syllables by pressing ‘Y’ for ‘yes’ or ‘N’ for ‘no’. For each participant, these 120 words were 
randomly divided into two lists of 60 adjectives. One list contained all the items involved 
during the encoding phase, the other list contained the items that would be used as foils 




items, assigned to one of the three conditions. The condition-specific lists were subdivided 
into two 10-item lists, one list per experimental block. 
During the encoding phase, participants were presented with the lists in separate 
blocks in an ABCCBA order allowing control for order effects for each participant. The order 
in which each category was presented across participants was also counterbalanced. Each 
block was preceded by a screen indicating the condition and began after a button press. 
Stimuli were separated by an inter-stimulus interval of 5000ms during which participants 
were shown a blank screen with a fixation cross. Following the evaluation phase, participants 
were presented with a surprise retrieval test in which they were shown words sequentially on- 
screen and asked whether or not that word had been presented in the previous phase. This 
retrieval phase contained all the words from the previous stage plus an equal number of new 
words contained in the retrieval list. Items were presented in a randomized order and 
participants had to either press ‘O’ for ‘old’ if they believed the word had appeared before or 
‘N’ for ‘new’ if they believed the word had not appeared before. The old/new responses 
judged as ‘old’ were followed by a source localization judgement in which participants had to 
indicate using arrow heads whether they thought the old word had been presented during the 
Self, Lady Gaga, or syllable-count condition. Accuracy and response time during the source- 
localisation judgement was recorded across the three conditions. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analysis was performed on the mental and physical language use 
variables from the DAF task in order to ascertain the appropriateness of subsequent multiple 
linear regression analysis. This stage of the analysis indicated normality of distribution of the 
residuals and homoscedasticity of data for mental and physical DAF variables. An initial 
correlation analysis was also performed, including all DAF task variables. To correct for 




descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the DAF task respectively). Physical 
language use on the DAF task was found to be significantly negatively correlated with mental 
language use, , rs = -.24, p (corrected) = .01, relationship comments, rs = -.27, p (corrected) = 
.01, self-reference comments, rs = -.34, p (corrected) = < .001 and behavioural comments, rs = 
-.27, p (corrected) = .01.Four participants were removed as outliers from the Self-Reference 
Task for accumulating scores greater or lower than 1.5 times the interquartile range, 13 
participants were also removed as outliers from the Paired Associates Task for accumulating 
scores greater or lower than 1.5 times the interquartile range, for a total of 17 participants’ 
scores being removed from further analysis in these two tasks. Mean number of words 
correctly remembered as ‘old’ in the Self-Reference Task were calculated for each 
participant. The proportion of correctly recalled associations at the delayed recall stage of the 
Paired Associates Task was also calculated for each participant as a measure of associative 
memory ability. Multiple linear regression and correlation analyses were then performed 
comparing levels of mental and physical language use on the DAF task against both 





Table 3.1. DAF Task Descriptive Statistics. 
 Mean SD Average 
Frequency 
Score 
DAF Mind-minded .20 .17 2.42 
DAF Physical .20 .22 1.79 
DAF Relationship .10 .17 1.04 
DAF Behavioural .28 .21 3.00 
DAF Self-reference .16 .18 1.64 
DAF General .06 .09 0.79 
Table 3.1: The mean scores and standard deviations (SD) and total frequency of use scores 
for each of the six response categories for each variable included in the DAF task. Variables 
are displayed as rows, mean scores, SD and average frequency scores for each measure as 




Table 3.2. DAF Task Correlations. 
  Mental    Physical  Relationship  Behavioural  Self-Reference  General 
Mental 1.00 -.24* -.27* .22* -.34* -.12 
Physical -.24* 1.00 -.27* -.27* -.34* .16 
Relationship -.27* -.27* 1.00 -.44* .33* -.04 
Behavioural .22* -.27* -.44* 1.00 -.36* -.16 
Self-Reference -.34* -.34* .33* -.36* 1.00 -.01 
General -.12 .16 -.04 -.16 -.01 1.00 
Table 3.2: Correlation coefficients for all DAF task variables. Note: * indicates p < .008 
(adjusted alpha level, .05/6). 
 
3.3.2. Relations between Friend Descriptions and Psychological Well Being 
A multiple linear regression analysis was performed in order to predict mind-
mindedness based on scores for the various measures of psychological wellbeing (see Table 
3.2 for descriptive statistics for Questionnaire variables). The various measures of trait 
rumination (RRS), trait anxiety (STAI), depression (CESD), Total (composite) ASQ score 
(ASQ), ADHD score (ASRS), daydreaming score (IPI), mindful attention score (MAAS), 
and the Quality of Life, Physical Health, Psychological Health. Social Relationships and 




100) were added as predictor variables. No effects of multicollinearity were observed 
between predictor variables. A significant regression was observed, F(11, 126) = 2.907, p = 
.002, with an R2 of .202. Levels of participant mind-mindedness on the DAF task were found 
to be significantly predicted by Trait Rumination score (β < .01, p = .002) and Daydreaming 
Frequency score (β < .01, p = .035). A trend towards significance for ASQ score as a 
predictor of mind-mindedness was also observed (β = .01, p = .055). Proportional scores for 
mental language use score on the DAF increased by .004 for every point increase in trait 
rumination score on the RRS and for every point increase in daydreaming frequency score on 
the IPI, whereas mental language use score on the DAF decreased by -.007 for every point 
increase in Total ASQ score (see Figure 3.1 for results). ADHD score on the ASRS was not 
found to be a significant predictor of mind-mindedness (p > .05, ns), Depression score on the 
CESD was not found to be a significant predictor of mind-mindedness (p > .05, ns), Mindful 
Attention scores on the MAAS was not found to be a significant predictor of mind-
mindedness (p > .05, ns), Trait Anxiety scores on the STAI was not found to be a significant 
predictor of mind-mindedness (p > .05, ns), the Quality of Life, Physical Health, 
Psychological Health, Social Relationships and Environmental Wellbeing subscales of the 
WHOQOL-100 were not found to be significant predictors of mind-mindedness (p > .05, ns). 
No significant regression was observed for physical language use on the DAF task, and no 




Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for Questionnaire and Wellbeing Measures. 
 Mean SD 
Total ASQ 1.84 1.90 
Trait Rumination 59.69 15.81 
Trait Anxiety 2.38 .22 
Depression 23.43 12.11 
Daydreaming 39.12 8.07 
ADHD 2.79 .50 
Mindful Attention 3.65 .68 
WHO Quality of Life 8.30 1.16 
WHO Physical 27.08 3.94 
WHO Psychological 19.72 2.78 
WHO Relationships 11.32 2.61 
Table 3.3: The mean scores and standard deviations (SD) for each measure of wellbeing. 




Figure 3.1. Regression Results for Questionnaire and Wellbeing Measures.
 
Figure 3.1. A: Trait rumination score (mean score on the RRS) compared across lower and 
higher levels of mind-mindedness. Mean trait rumination score is displayed along the y-axis. 
Low and high levels of mind-mindedness are displayed along the x-axis. B: Daydreaming 
score (mean daydreaming score on the IPI) compared across lower and higher levels of 
mind-mindedness. Mean trait daydreaming score is displayed along the y-axis. Low and high 
levels of mind-mindedness are displayed along the x-axis. 
 
Correlation analysis was also performed comparing mental and physical language along with 
all questionnaire variables (see Table 3.4 for correlation coefficients). An adjusted alpha level 
of p = .004 was adopted to control for multiple comparisons. A significant positive correlation 
was observed between mental language use and rumination rs = .32, p (corrected) < .001 and a 
significant negative correlation was observed between mental language use and physical 
language use on the DAF task, rs = -.24, p (corrected) = .03. Depression measures on the 
CESD were also observed to significantly correlate with a number of variables; possessing 
significant positive correlations with trait anxiety on the STAI, rs = .28, p (corrected) = .01, 
and ADHD scores on the ASRS, rs = .37, p (corrected) < .001 and possessing significant 
negative correlations with mindful attention on the MAAS, rs =- .32, p (corrected) < .001, and 




Physical Health, rs  = -.56, p (corrected) < .001, Psychological Health, rs = -.54, p (corrected) 
< .001, Social Relationships, rs = -.36, p (corrected) < .001, and Environmental Wellbeing, rs 
= -.38, p (corrected) < .001. 
Rumination on the RRS was observed to possess significant positive correlations with 
depression on the CESD, rs = .58, p (corrected) < .001, daydreaming on the IPI, rs = .36, p 
(corrected) < .001, trait anxiety on the STAI, rs = .38, p (corrected) < .001, and ADHD score 
on the ASRS, rs = .42, p (corrected) < .001 and significant negative correlations with mindful 
attention on the MAAS, rs = -.34, p (corrected) < .001, and the five subscales of the 
WHOQOL-100 - Quality of Life, rs = -.34, p (corrected) < .001, Physical Health, rs = -.45, p 
(corrected) < .001, Psychological Health, rs = -.42, p (corrected) < .001, Social Relationships, 
rs = -.29, p (corrected) < .001, and Environmental Wellbeing, rs = -.28, p (corrected) = .001. 
Daydreaming on the IPI was found to possess a significant positive correlation with trait 
anxiety on the STAI, rs = .25, p (corrected) < .03 and significant negative correlations with 
ADHD score on the ASRS, rs = -.29, p (corrected) < .001, and the Psychological Health 
subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = -.36, p (corrected) < .04. Scores for mindful attention on 
the MAAS were observed to have significant negative correlations with trait anxiety on the 
STAI, rs = -.29, p (corrected) < .001, and ADHD score on the ASRS, rs = -.55, p (corrected) < 
.001. 
The Quality of Life subscale of the WHOQOL-100 was observed to have significant positive 
correlations with the Physical Health subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = .46, p (corrected) < 
.001, the Psychological Health subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = .42, p (corrected) < .001, 
the Social Relationships subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = .41, p (corrected) < .001 and the 
Environmental Wellbeing subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs  = .48, p (corrected) < .001. The 
Physical Health subscale of the WHOQOL-100 was observed to have significant positive 
correlations with the Psychological Health subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = .42, p 




(corrected) < .001, and the Environmental Wellbeing subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = .49, 
p (corrected) < .001, and a significant negative correlation with ADHD score on the ASRS, rs 
= -.35, p (corrected) < .001.  
The Psychological Health subscale of the WHOQOL-100 was observed to have significant 
positive correlations with mindful attention score on the MAAS, rs = .34, p (corrected) < .001, 
the Social Relationships subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs = .40, p (corrected) < .001 and the 
Environmental Wellbeing subscale of the WHOQOL-100, rs  = .38, p (corrected) < .001, and 
a significant negative correlation with ADHD score on the ASRS, rs = -.26, p (corrected) < 
.001. No other variables were found to significantly correlate after correcting for multiple 




Table 3.4. Correlation Coefficients for Questionnaire and Wellbeing Measures. 
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Table 3.4 (Continued). 
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Table 3.4: Correlation coefficients for mind-mindedness (mental language use) and physical 
language use compared against all questionnaire variables. * indicates a significance level of p 




3.3.3. Relations between Friend Descriptions and Memory 
Initial analyses revealed the presence of a self-reference effect, with mean 
proportions of correct responses were significantly higher for the Self category compared 
to both the Lady Gaga category, t149) = 11.51, p (corrected) < .001, and the syllables 
category, t(149) = 11.60, p (corrected) < .001 (an alpha level of .05/3 = .017 was adopted 
to control for multiple comparisons, see Table 3.5 for descriptive statistics). As with the 
questionnaire measures, multiple linear regression analysis was performed to identify 
potential relationships between mind-mindedness measures and the two behavioural 
memory tasks: proportions of correct responses for delayed recall on the paired associates 
memory task and the three conditions of the SRT. No significant regression was observed 
for mental language use on the DAF task, and no significant predictors of mental language 
use were observed among the included behavioural measures (p > .05, ns). No significant 
regression was observed for physical language use on the DAF task, and no significant 
predictors of physical language use were observed (p > .05, ns). 
In order to determine whether mind-mindedness may be related to differences in 
memory for self or others as referents respectively, a difference score between Self and 
Lady Gaga responses on the SRT was calculated by deducting the number of correct 
responses for the Lady Gaga condition from the number of correct responses for the Self 
condition, providing an indicator of magnitude for the previously-observed self reference 
effect for each participant. Correlation analysis was then performed comparing both mental 
and physical language use on the DAF task along with the calculated difference scores for 
Self and Lady Gaga. An alpha level of .02 (.05/3) was adopted to control for multiple 
comparisons. This stage of analysis revealed no significant relationship between magnitude 
of the self reference effect and mental, p (corrected) > .05, ns, or physical language use on 
the DAF task, p (corrected) > .05, ns.  




along with all behavioural variables (see Table 3.6 for correlation coefficients). An 
adjusted alpha level of p = .008 was adopted to control for multiple comparisons. A 
significant negative correlation was observed between mental language use and physical 
language use on the DAF task, rs = -.22, p (corrected) = .04. A significant positive 
correlation was also observed between responses to the Self and Lady Gaga conditions on 
the SRT, rs = .42, p (corrected) = < .001. A significant positive correlation was also 
observed between responses to the Self and Syllables conditions on the SRT, rs = .35, p 
(corrected) = < .001. A significant positive correlation was also observed between 
responses to Lady Gaga and Syllables conditions on the SRT, rs = .92, p (corrected) = < 
.001.  
Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics for Behavioural Measures.  
 Mean SD 
Self (SRT) .79 .15 
Lady Gaga (SRT) .63 .19 
Syllables (SRT) .62 .19 
Recall (PA) .56 .26 
Table 3.5: The mean scores and standard deviations (SD) for each behavioural measure. 
Variables are displayed as rows, mean scores (proportion correct) and SD are displayed 
as columns. 





Table 3.6. Correlation Coefficients for Behavioural Measures. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Mental (DAF) 1.00 -.22** .07 .10 .18* .13 
2. Physical (DAF) -.22** 1.00 -.01 -.05 -.02 -.01 
3. Paired Associates .07 -.01 1.00 .05 .13 .12 
4. Self (SRT) .01 -.05 .05 1.00 .42** .35** 
5. Lady Gaga (SRT) .18* -.02 .13 .42** 1.00 .92** 
6. Syllables (SRT) .131 -.01 .12 .35** .92** 1.00 
Table 3.6: Correlation coefficients for mind-mindedness (mental language use) and physical 
language use compared against all behavioural variables. * indicates a significance level of 
p (uncorrected) <.05, ** indicates a significance level of p (uncorrected) < .01. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
The results of the current study simultaneously assist in the clarification of the link 
between mind-mindedness and memory processes, and reveals a relationship between mind-
mindedness and measures of wellbeing. Spontaneously focusing on mental and emotional 
characteristics when describing a close personal friend was associated with greater levels of 
rumination and daydreaming; both involving self-generated processing. Mind-mindedness 
was also shown to have no relationship with memory for self, a personally unknown other or 
semantic memory. Taken together, our data suggest that in accordance with the findings of 
Meins et al. (2014) and of Study 1, mind-mindedness is dependent on the availability of 
episodic memories of previous social interactions and not related to general declarative and 
semantic memory capacity. Also in accordance with hypothesised outcomes is the finding 




thought, namely daydreaming and rumination. 
Initial correlation analysis of the DAF task sample revealed that people who scored 
higher for mental state language use were less likely to talk about their friend’s physical 
qualities. This finding is interesting as previous studies have observed no relationship 
between mental and physical language use. One factor to account for that may help explain 
this effect is the relatively large sample size of the present study compared to previous 
investigations into mind-mindedness, which may have revealed some underlying relationship 
between mental and physical language use. Some previous literature suggests that there exists 
a mutually inhibitory relationship between activity in brain regions associated with 
mentalisation and brain regions associated with external/physical cognition (i.e. thinking and 
reasoning about external physical inanimate objects), resulting in a tendency to either 
emphasise focus on mental or physical properties respectively (Jack et al., 2013). It may 
therefore be the case that individuals are more likely to preferentially focus on either mental 
or physical characteristics during the DAF task. 
However, further investigation also reveals that physical language use on the DAF 
task did not demonstrate a significant negative correlation with mental language use alone, 
but with all categories of the DAF task aside from the ‘general’ category. Accordingly, there 
may be no specific relationship between mental and physical language use on the DAF task, 
but rather it may be that participants were likely to either interpret DAF task requirements as 
providing primarily physical descriptions in a manner that other DAF categories were not 
included, or as providing a more general background which would include usage of other 
DAF categories at the expense of providing physical descriptions. 
Correlation analysis for the DAF task also replicated the findings of Study 1 by 
revealing a negative relationship between referring to the nature of the relationship between 
participants and their friends and referring to the behaviour of friends. In addition to this, 




comments, indicating that where participants were more likely to refer to themselves on the 
DAF task, they were more likely to also refer to the nature of their relationship with their 
friends. Conversely, where participants were more likely to describe the behaviour of their 
friends (and thus less likely to make relationship comments), they were less likely to refer to 
themselves. Together these findings grant further support to the view suggesting that 
participants were more likely to adopt a narrative reflecting shared ‘We’ memories when 
describing the behaviours of close friends (Beike, Cole & Merrick, 2017), entailing them 
being more likely to refer to themselves and the dynamic of the relationship between their 
close friends as-opposed to simply listing their friend’s behaviours. 
We also observed significant negative correlations between mental language use on 
the DAF task and both relationship comments and self-references. Previous work has found 
that processing the mental states of the self and close others share a large degree of functional 
overlap in the brain (Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2007) and 
accordingly the resources recruited during the DAF task to provide descriptions of a close 
other are likely to be allocated to constructing narratives from a self-referent or other-referent 
perspective, respectively. Finally, initial DAF correlations revealed that greater levels of 
mental language use on the DAF were positively correlated with behavioural language use. If 
mind-mindedness involves the spontaneous use of mentalisation to interpret behaviours as 
the work of Meins (1997) suggests, then it is possible that when completing the DAF task, 
participants more likely to describe the behaviour of their friend in terms of their mental 
states and motivations would draw upon a wider range of previous behaviours from memory 
in order to form the narrative of their friend’s internal mental states. 
Correlations also confirmed that higher scores for depression were associated with 
higher scores for anxiety and rumination, indicating the common comorbidity of these traits. 
Previous work suggests that rumination serves as a mediator between anxiety and depression, 




Roelofs, Rassin, Franken & Mayer, 2005). Increased scores for depression were also 
associated with lower scores for perceived quality of life, across all five subcategories. 
Quality of life, including environmental, health and social factors, possesses important 
situational determinants which illnesses such as depression can impact (Barge-Schaapveld, 
Nicolson, Berkhof & de Vries, 1999), resulting in lower subjective appraisal for overall 
quality of life. 
Daydreaming also was found to be related to increased scores for both anxiety and 
rumination, both commonly co-occurring traits (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Shrimpton, 
McGann and Riby (2017) observed that daydreaming can be separated into subcategories of 
‘reflective’ (positive or constructive self-assessment) and ‘ruminative’ (negative or critical) 
focus, with increased rated ruminative focus being associated with greater levels of trait 
rumination and anxiety. Accordingly, individuals more inclined to towards ruminative 
thinking appear to demonstrate higher levels of ruminative focus when daydreaming, 
manifesting also in increased scores for trait anxiety. Higher levels of daydreaming were also 
associated with lower ratings for psychological health. Previous literature has labelled 
excessive frequency and intensity of daydreams as maladaptive daydreaming (Bigelsen, 
Lehrfeld, Jopp & Somer, 2016) which is in-turn associated with greater predisposition 
towards ADHD, OCD and depressive symptoms. These findings therefore further 
demonstrate that while daydreaming is an integral part of everyday cognitive function, at 
excessive levels of occurrence it may become associated with or symptomatic of detriments 
to psychological health. 
The finding of increased scores for ADHD being associated with higher levels of trait 
rumination, greater frequency of daydreams and lower levels of mindful attention 
demonstrates a link between ADHD individuals and difficulty with sustained external 
attentional focus. Interestingly, higher ADHD scores on the ASRS were also associated with 




quality of life measures. Statements pertaining to physical health on the WHOQOL covered 
areas such as ‘activities of daily living’, ‘reliance on medicinal substances’, ‘energy and 
fatigue’ and ‘work capacity’ whereas psychological statements covered areas such as 
‘negative feelings’, ‘memory and concentration’ and ‘learning’. These associations appear to 
reflect the potential negative outcomes of ADHD in terms of disorganized or sporadic 
behaviour and difficulties with concentration (Harpin, 2004). 
Greater scores for mindful attention were found to be associated with lower levels of 
anxiety, depression and rumination. Greater scores for mindful attention were also found to 
be associated with overall higher scores for psychological health. Previous research by 
Shapiro, Brown and Biegel (2007) has investigated the effects of Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) therapy, involving training in mindful attention-based techniques, on 
training therapists. Participants involved in the program reported decreased levels of stress, 
negative affect, rumination, and state and trait anxiety. Overall, these findings suggest that 
greater levels of mindful attention are associated with increased positive psychological health 
perceptions. 
Various quality of life measures were also seen to interrelate. As could be expected, 
higher overall subjective perceptions of quality of life were associated with the subcategories 
of physical and psychological health, environmental wellbeing and social relationships. Also, 
better ratings for physical health were associated with higher scores for psychological health, 
social relationships and environmental wellbeing. In turn, greater levels of psychological 
health were associated with higher scores for social relationships and environmental 
wellbeing. These findings accord with previous work utilising the WHOQOL, reporting such 
intercorrelations between the five subcategories as evidence of the internal consistency of the 
applied measures as predictors of different areas of quality of life (Skevington, 1999). 
A trend towards significance was observed between mental language use on the DAF 




the present study that the myriad detriments to social cognitive ability in general, and 
mentalisation in particular, posed by intense autistic spectrum symptoms (Senju, 2013) would 
also lead to lower levels of mind-mindedness. ASD individuals therefore, with deficiencies in 
their ability to mentalise, appear to be demonstrating the extent to which mentalisation is a 
core component process of mind-mindedness, without which it fails to effectively emerge as 
a higher-order process. 
The finding of greater levels of mind-mindedness being associated with an increased 
tendency to ruminate and daydream confirms a hypothesis of the present study and may 
capture the role of self-generated processes in the capacity to adopt a perspective on another 
individual that takes account of their internal states. Rumination is understood as repeated 
attention given towards goal-oriented thinking, characterised by a perceived failure in or 
anxiety about achieving those goals (Watkins, 2008), and social interactions and socially-
relevant information can often be a cause of rumination. As mentioned previously, 
rumination appears to serve primarily as an emotion-regulation strategy (Gruber et al., 2011) 
and involves thinking about the perceived causes of one’s affective state (Nolen-Hoeksema 
et al., 2008).  
Rumination therefore largely seems to grow from a strategy for the avoidance of 
negative social consequences, however repeated negative rumination is considered 
maladaptive and not conducive towards psychological wellbeing. Zou and Abbott (2012) 
demonstrated that the degree of negative rumination experienced concerning a social 
interaction was significantly related to the self-perception and appraisal of participants 
concerning their performance in that social interaction. Earlier work has also shown that 
rumination over a social interaction is associated with the level of anxiety associated with 
that interaction (Kashdan & Roberts, 2006). Rumination has been found to enhance recall for 
negative information and produce bias towards the encoding of negative experiences (Kuo et 




quality of maladaptive problem-solving utilising a mechanism of automatic memory retrieval 
serving to encourage deeper levels of memory encoding for previous negative experiences. 
In many ways mind-mindedness also serves as a means to social problem-solving by 
facilitating interactions with the provision of relevant information, encouraging the 
development of flexible mental state models (Meins, 2013). Like rumination, mind-
mindedness may also accomplish this in an automatic manner (Meins, et al., 1998, 2001). 
At a cognitive level, our study suggests that although mind-mindedness may be 
partially-rooted in memory processes, it specifically draws-upon episodic memories, and in 
particular those linked to social information. We found no observable link between levels of 
mind-mindedness and the retrieval of information encoded incidentally with respect to 
making associations with Lady Gaga, information encoded incidentally with relation to the 
self, or information encoded through its phonological structure. The same was true for 
memory encoded with a view to subsequent recognition in an explicit manner (i.e. the Paired 
Associates Task). Previous work by Meins et al. (2014) comparing levels of mental state 
language use when describing one’s best friend, a famous figure, or a work of art has shown 
that mind-mindedness is most expressed in close relationships, as-opposed to being a general 
trait-like construct applied equally across categories of social relationships. Being a facet of 
personal relationships, it appears that mind-mindedness relies on memories of past shared of 
similar experiences with another person, in order to create a mental model of an individual 
which we can utilise to explain and predict mental states (Liberman, 2007). This process 
necessitates drawing on our knowledge reserves about an individual in a manner that may be 
classified as a form of spontaneous social thought. Our study suggests that this information 
may be encoded to memory and subsequently drawn-upon in an automatic manner when 
mind minded people consider a personally known individual. 
Previous studies analysing the components of the form and content of spontaneous 




large and consistent component of daydreaming (Engert et al., 2014; Ruby et al., 2013). 
Similarly, Spreng (2013) has argued that a fundamental and ongoing process involved in 
spontaneous thought is social cognition, or an attempt at building mental models of others 
based on interactions in order to navigate the social world more successfully. This process 
may be adaptive since Ruby et al. (2013) have observed that individuals who engage more 
heavily in social thinking during daydreaming produce high numbers of solutions to social 
problems. Viewed in this context, the observation of a relation between mind-mindedness and 
an increased tendency to daydream suggests that the construct of mind-mindedness represents 
an applied form of this spontaneous thought, dedicated to the task of assisting our 
interpretation of complex social cues and motivations. 
Also as hypothesised, levels of mind-mindedness had no observable effect on the 
encoding of words associated with Lady Gaga in the SRT. Accordingly, when we consider 
the findings of the present study alongside evidence gathered from Study 1 suggesting that 
individuals scoring higher for mind-mindedness were more effective at encoding social 
information to memory, it appears that although the Lady Gaga condition represented a 
category pertaining to another individual, the case being that Lady Gaga represented a 
personally unknown other, about whom participants had no access to memories of shared 
interactions, meant that participants were not significantly more likely to refer to mental 
states in their descriptions, as they had little material with which to formulate a mental model 
from memory (Lieberman, 2007). The previous proposition of Meins et al. (2014) that mind-
mindedness is formulated as a product of closer social relationships therefore appears to hold 
true, as we observed participants utilise cognitive faculties related to mind-mindedness when 
undergoing a memory recognition task for previously viewed social interactions, but not 
when engaged in a memory recognition task that involved generally associating terms with a 
personally unknown-other. 




personal interactions with another individual and semantic knowledge with which we are 
able to categorise others with layers of associated meaning (Hampson, 1982). Previous 
research has suggested a distinct steam of processing between social-cognitive abilities such 
as mentalisation, and social semantic category judgements, implicating activity in the 
bilateral anterior temporal cortex along with the mPFC with the processing of social 
semantic categories (Zahn et al., 2007), and suggesting that the superior anterior temporal 
cortex plays a key role in social semantic information processing by providing abstract 
conceptual knowledge of social behaviours which can be combined with other cognitive 
processes such as mentalisation in order to provide a flexible interpretation of social 
interactions. Previous research investigating semantic knowledge for famous figures has 
further shown that the right temporal lobe has a privileged role for representing person-
specific semantic knowledge and the left temporal lobe for general semantic knowledge 
(Snowden, Thompson & Neary, 2012). Accordingly, it can be reasonably suggested that the 
cognitive processes recruited when asking participants to make semantic associations with a 
famous figure (Lady Gaga) in the SRT during the present study were distinctly related to the 
representation of social semantic knowledge, and not of mental states, potentially explaining 
the absence of a relationship between mental language use on the DAF task and memory 
during the Lady Gaga condition of the SRT.  
The findings of the present study also provide further insight into the potential nature 
of mind-mindedness as a quality of close social relationships. The observation that mind-
mindedness appears to partially depend on the retrieval of relevant information about past 
interactions from episodic memory, as-opposed to being linked to a general memory 
capacity, suggests that mind-minded comments arise from the automatic retrieval of 
knowledge of shared past similar experiences. This viewpoint accords with that of Mitchell, 
Macrae and Banaji (2004), who stated that as social interactions are inherently complex, 




interactions. Amodio and Ratner (2011) have further suggested that this process can occur 
implicitly, outside of the conscious awareness of the individual, whereby automatic 
associations with certain social signals are formed in a manner prompting the retrieval of 
previous similar experiences from memory. It is possible that individuals demonstrating 
greater levels of mind-mindedness have in some way implicitly learned to respond to certain 
social cues and events through engaging in mentalisation and drawing upon prior experiences 
in order to help form meaningful narratives about social interactions. 
The form and nature of social relationships in terms of their closeness and mutual 
liking of individuals for one-another also has bearing on the manner in which we engage in 
social interactions and subsequently implicitly learn from them. Hudson, Nijboer and Jellema 
(2012) provided evidence that pro-social dispositions and social cues of positive emotional 
valence facilitate processes of implicit social learning. Accordingly, it may be the case that 
mind-minded individuals are more likely to attribute mental states to others when they are 
engaged in close, emotionally positive relationships due to this facilitative effect. Further 
work conducted by Heerey and Velani (2010) has also demonstrated that the subjectively-
reported levels of personal liking we have for another individual are predictive of our ability 
to understand another person’s behavior using nonverbal social cues. When these findings are 
considered alongside those of the present study, we may consider a potential explanation or 
the relational basis of mind-mindedness. It may be that mind-mindedness arises from 
behaviours learned implicitly during social interactions, serving to maintain close 
relationships with others in the face of complex and dynamic social events, by encouraging 
awareness of the intentions and emotions of other people across time. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that mind-mindedness may reflect a construct in 
which social information about other individuals is automatically retrieved. We speculate that 
this may take the form of narratives focused on the mental processes of others, since this is 




Narrative formation and rehearsal is one of the fundamental ways in which we are able to 
make sense of complex situations, such as social interactions and predicting the intentions of 
others. Previous work carried out by Bird et al. (2015) showed participants a series of video 
clips depicting ‘complex event sequences’. Many of these video clips portrayed social 
interactions as examples of these sequences, finding that forming a narrative about what was 
observed during the course of the events displayed, and subsequently rehearsing that 
narrative, greatly improved subsequent recall of the contents of the clip. Narrative formation 
therefore facilitates the encoding of dynamic situations such as social interactions by 
providing a method of event segmentation, allowing for notable features of interaction to be 
stored and subsequently retrieved in working memory. Event segmentation involves 
parceling a stream of notable occurrences with definitive ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ boundaries 
(Zacks & Swallow, 2007), and subtle social cues are able to serve as markers for these event 
boundaries (Boggia & Ristic, 2015). The observed increased recall for socially-relevant 
information exemplified by mind-minded individuals therefore provides evidence for the 
increased salience of mental features when mind-minded individuals segment events into 
retrievable memories allowing for narrative formation in memory. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Together, the results of our study provide evidence that mind-mindedness is linked to 
both the manner in which we spontaneously retrieve socially-relevant information and the 
way we represent other people in episodic memory. Mind-minded individuals have been 
shown to engage more frequently in rumination and daydreaming, both being processes that 
depend on the self-generation of mental content (Zou & Abbott, 2012, Ruby et al., 2013, 
Engert et al., 2014). The cognitive mechanisms underlying the ruminative and daydreaming 
tendencies assessed by their corresponding questionnaire measures, therefore, appear to 
implicate processes of spontaneous or automatic social information retrieval (Greenwald & 




both rumination and mind-wandering. Mind-mindedness has also been shown to enhance 
incidental memory for social information (as discussed in Study 1) suggesting that part of 
what makes a person exhibit mind-minded behaviour is a tendency to form strong memory 
traces about socially-relevant information when interacting with other people. It is possible 
that mind-mindedness therefore reflects a pattern of cognition in which the tendency to self-
generate experiences using social information from memory manifests in the form of a 
narrative in memory with focus on mental states. Accordingly, future work in this area 
should potentially focus on the nature of the overlap between these cognitive processes of 
memory, social cognition and spontaneous thought and language processes to explore how 
and why different people focus on the internal features of another individual, while others do 
not. Future studies could further explore the relationship between mind-mindedness, 
episodic memory and spontaneous thought by examining the neural basis of individual 
differences in mind mindedness in order to establish whether systems involved in this 







Study 3: Exploring the Neural Components of Mind-Mindedness 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Social cognition arises from the interplay of multiple processes spanning the 
perceptual, cognitive, and social domains. To interact successfully with another person we 
must infer their internal states, a process known as mentalisation (Frith & Frith, 2006b), 
which is enriched by our semantic knowledge of the world and our prior interactions with 
specific individuals. For example, Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) observed that 
by implicitly priming participants with pronouns denoting an ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’ status, 
subsequent judgements about person descriptors can be altered, suggesting that semantic 
knowledge has an effect on the way we socially categorize others. 
Episodic memory processes also function as major components of social cognition 
because the recollection of previous experiences helps support our conceptual models of 
other people (Hassabis et al., 2013). Consistent with this view, Davidson, Drouin, Kwan, 
Moscovitch and Rosenbaum (2012) reported that patients with amnesia are less likely to 
form and maintain social bonds. This study is one of many highlighting the necessity of a 
functional memory system for successfully navigating the social world. Our memories about 
other people allow us access to a mental history of their behaviour, which can influence our 
thoughts and behaviour in the present by providing a model of previous similar interactions 
which we may use to navigate the social world (Spreng, 2013). In line with this proposal, 
Ciaramelli et al. (2013) have shown that memory of an individual’s past experiences 
modulates subsequent empathic responses towards them. These lines of evidence suggest 
that social cognition depends, in part, upon episodic and semantic knowledge based on prior 
social interactions, and when these different forms of representations are used appropriately 




Prior neuroimaging research has highlighted that social cognition is associated with 
neural processes in a variety of different brain networks. One system that has become a focus 
of research into social cognition is the so-called default mode network (DMN). Mars et al. 
(2012) demonstrated a large degree of functional overlap between the DMN and regions 
known to play an important role in socio-cognitive processing, including the posterior 
cingulate cortex (pCC), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the left and right angular 
gyri (ANG). Consistent with a relation between memory and social processing, regions in the 
DMN, including the pCC, are associated with the consolidation of event narratives in 
memory. For example, Bird et al. (2015) demonstrated that the pCC is recruited during the 
rehearsal of narratives for complex event sequences, such as social interactions. The DMN 
has also been shown to exhibit a common pattern of neural activation for both reflection on 
the past and ToM abilities, with ToM tasks engaging lateral, and memory tasks engaging 
midline, DMN areas (Spreng & Grady, 2010), consistent with the view that memory systems 
are a central component of social cognition (Hassabis et al., 2013). 
Other studies have highlighted the importance of the limbic network in social 
processing. A recent resting state study found that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) plays an important role in memory for both self-relevant information and 
information about personally salient others, through its connectivity with other large-scale 
networks, including the DMN and the fronto-parietal network (FPN; de Caso et al., 2017). 
The limbic network is also likely to be important in social cognition because of its role in 
memory and emotional processing. Hariri, Bookheimer, and Mazziotta (2000) recorded 
increased activity in the left and right amygdala in response to a face-matching task involving 
pairing-off faces showing similar emotional states, with limbic responses specifically 
associated with the processing of frightened faces. Finally, studies have shown the 
involvement of regions associated with executive control, as supported by the FPN, in 




both the FPN and DMN in tasks of social problem solving (e.g., Spreng & Grady, 2010) and 
in situations when participants must maintain social information in working memory (Meyer 
& Matthew, 2012). However, recent work has suggested that the role of the FPN in social 
working memory may in fact reflect non-social processes that are engaged by the task 
demands, rather than the act of maintaining social information in-mind per se (Meyer, 
Taylor, & Lieberman, 2015). 
The present study is a large-scale individual difference study aimed at exploring the 
neural correlates of a specific aspect of social cognition: mind-mindedness (Meins, 1997). 
Mind-mindedness is a construct characterized by a tendency to spontaneously invoke internal 
states during social interactions or when recalling details of another person (Meins et al., 
1998, 2001). Mind-mindedness has been proposed to be a quality of close relationships rather 
than a trait (Meins et al., 2014), since it is most prevalent when describing personally familiar 
individuals, and mind-minded descriptions of significant others are unrelated to mind-minded 
descriptions of famous figures or works of art (Hill & McMahon, 2016; Meins et al., 2014). 
Attempts to establish why some individuals are more mind-minded than others have 
largely drawn null findings. Studies focusing on caregivers’ descriptions of their children 
have shown that there are no clear associations between mind-mindedness and caregiver SES, 
educational level, or occupational status (e.g., Fishburn et al., 2017; Lundy, 2013; Meins et 
al., 1998). Research has also shown that mind-mindedness is unrelated to ToM abilities both 
in childhood (Meins et al., 2006) and adulthood (Barreto et al., 2016; See Chapter 3, Section 
3.1 for more details on mind-mindedness). 
In the present study we assessed mind-mindedness in a large cohort of participants for 
whom measures of intrinsic organisation as assessed using resting state functional magnetic 
resonance imaging were available. Mind-mindedness was assessed by acquiring open-ended 
descriptions of a close friend, which were coded to determine the extent to which they 




these descriptions of the best friend to the functional organization of the brain at rest, 
focusing on the organization of large-scale networks that support different aspects of higher 
order cognition. It was hypothesised that significant variance in levels of functional 
connectivity related to levels of mind-mindedness would be observed for both the FPN and 
the DMN due to their respective involvement with the processing of multiple facets of social 
cognition (Meyer & Matthew, 2012; Spreng & Grady, 2010).  
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 157 right-handed individuals aged between 18 and 35 years (M = 
20.28, SD = 2.67). All participants were the same individuals tested in Study 2. All 
participants were native English speakers. Participants were undergraduate students who 
were recruited via the Department’s online participant pool. Participants were paid £80 or an 
equivalent worth of course credit for completing the behavioural and fMRI scanning 
components of the study (a total of four sessions). Both components of the study were 
approved by the relevant University Ethics Committees. The study was conducted according 
to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki, and for both components, 
participants provided written informed consent. 
For the purposes of a sanity check, an independent resting-state data sample of 140 
right-handed participants between 18 and 35 years (Nooner et al., 2012) was also utilised for 
the purposes of determining the intrinsic organisation of any significant clusters. In this way, 
any brain regions with patterns of functional connectivity highlighted as demonstrating a 
significant relationship with mind-mindedness could be seeded in a totally separate sample 
of participants and the location of any revealed brain regions corroborated across the two 
datasets. This allowed us to provide independent validation of the result gained from the 
present study’s sample. 




Participants completed all sections of the study across four sessions, held on separate 
days, over the course of one week. In session one, the resting-state functional network of 
participants was acquired, along with structural and FLAIR scan data in a scanning session 
lasting around an hour in total. In sessions 2, 3, and 4, participants completed a battery of 
behavioural tasks, each measuring variance in some form of higher-order cognitive function, 
and lasting around 2 hours. Although a battery of tasks was administered, Study 2 assesses 
behavioural data from these other measures (See Chapter 3). Study 3 here specifically focuses 
on mind-mindedness data from the describe-a-friend task (Meins et al., 2008, 2014). The 
order of behavioural tasks in each battery remained constant, but the administration of the 
three task batteries was counterbalanced across sessions. All behavioural measures were 
programmed and presented to participants using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
4.2.2.1. Mind-Mindedness. 
The describe-a-friend task (Meins et al., 2008, 2014) was used to assess mind- 
mindedness. The task was administered using a computer. Participants were informed that 
there were no right or wrong answers to the task, that they were free to describe their friend 
in any way they chose, and that there, while there was no time limit, they should aim to spend 
around 5 minutes on the task. Participants were then presented with a blank screen, with the 
following instruction: “Think of your best friend. If you have more than one, choose one of 
your best friends to think about. Use the space on the page below to describe your friend. 
You may write as much as you want”. 
Participant responses were later coded according to criteria in the Mind-Mindedness 
Coding Manual (Meins & Fernyhough, 2015). Each description was then placed it into one of 
the following exhaustive and exclusive categories: Mind-Minded, Behavioural, Physical, 
Self-referential, Relationship, and General, in the same manner as Study 1 (See Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.2.1). All descriptions were coded by a trained researcher, and another trained 




was  = .85. Participants received scores for each category as a percentage of the total 
number of descriptions produced in order to control for the amount written (See Table 3.2). 
Scores for mind-minded descriptions indexed participants’ mind-mindedness in relation to 
their close friends, and scores for physical descriptions were selected to index participants’ 
knowledge of their friends that did not emphasise internal states 
4.2.2.2. Resting-State Acquisition. 
Structural and functional data were acquired using a 3T GE HDx Excite MRI scanner 
utilising an eight-channel phased array head coil (GE) tuned to 127.4 MHz, at the York 
Neuroimaging Centre, University of York. Structural MRI acquisition in all participants was 
based on a T1-weighted 3D fast spoiled gradient echo sequence (TR = 7.8 s, TE = minimum 
full, flip angle= 20°, matrix size = 256 x 256, 176 slices, voxel size = 1.13 x 1.13 x 1 mm). 
Resting-state activity was recorded from the whole brain using single-shot 2D gradient-echo- 
planar imaging (TR = 3 s, TE = minimum full, flip angle = 90°, matrix size = 64 x 64, 60 
slices, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3 mm3, 180 volumes). Participants viewed a fixation cross with 
eyes open for the durations of the functional MRI resting state scan. A FLAIR scan with the 
same orientation as the functional scans was collected to improve co-registration between 
subject-specific structural and functional scans. 
4.2.2.3. Resting-State fMRI Analysis. 
Seed regions were networks defined by Yeo et al. (2011, see Figure 4.1). In order to 
assess a wide variety of connectivity networks associated with higher-order cognitive 
functions, networks 3-7 were specifically chosen as seed regions in the analysis. These 
networks included: 3 – the dorsal attention network, 4 – the ventral attention network, 5 – the 




1 and 2 (the visual and somatomotor networks) were not included as seed regions, due to 
their association with the processing of largely lower-order, unimodal sensory 
representations. 
 
Figure 4.1. Yeo Parcellation of Resting-State Brain Networks. 
 
Figure 4.1. The 7-sections liberal functional parcellation of resting-state brain networks. The 
7 networks and their associated colours are 1) Visual (dark purple), 2) Somatomotor (blue), 
3) Dorsal Attention (green), 4) Ventral Attention (light purple), 5) Limbic (White), 6) Fronto- 
parietal (orange) and 7) Default Mode Network (pink). Networks 3-7 are utilised as seed 
regions for the analysis. 
 
Functional and structural data were pre-processed and analysed using FMRIB’s 
Software Library (FSL version 4.1, http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FEAT/; Jenkinson, 
Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012). Individual FLAIR and T1 weighted 
structural brain images were extracted using BET (Brain Extraction Tool). Structural images 
were linearly registered to the MNI-152 template using FMRIB's Linear Image Registration 
Tool (FLIRT). The resting state functional data were pre-processed and analysed using the 
FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). The individual subject analysis involved: motion 
correction using MCFLIRT; slice-timing correction using Fourier space time-series phase- 




normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; highpass temporal 
filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 100 s); 
Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with sigma = 2.8s. 
We extracted the time series from each of the masks and used these as explanatory variables 
in a functional connectivity analysis. In each analysis, we utilised a grey matter mask in MNI 
space to restrict our search from areas of white matter or CSF. 
To control for multiple comparisons across the five seed network models investigated, 
we used a cluster forming threshold of Z = 2.6 and controlled our Type I error rate at an alpha 
value of p < .01 (controlling for the 5 models we tested in this experiment). For each model 
we explored patterns of functional connectivity that were associated with high levels of mind- 
minded descriptions, high levels of physical descriptions, and the interactions between both 
types of description. We uploaded unthresholded maps from our analyses onto Neurosynth 
(Yarkoni et al., 2011) at the following URL: http://neurovault.org/collections/1681/. 
4.3. Results 
Our analysis examines the relation between mind-mindedness and patterns of intrinsic 
functional connectivity. We related connectivity patterns of our seed regions to variation in 
different describe-a-friend response categories. For the purposes of the present study, the 
describe-a-friend mind-minded description category was utilised as the primary measure of 
mind-mindedness, with the physical description category being implemented as a control 
comparison since it describe pertinent features of the individual but that do not emphasise 
internal states (See Chapter 3, Table 3.2 for mean proportional and frequency scores on the 
DAF task). Due to non-normal data distribution we divided participants into groups based on 
whether they were above or below the median for both mind-minded and physical 
descriptions. This yielded four groups: low mental/low physical, low mental/high physical, 
high mental/low physical, and high mental/high physical.  




for the fronto-parietal seed region is displayed in Figure 4.2. Analysis revealed a significant 
increase in connectivity between the FPN and the pCC associated with lower levels of mind-
minded descriptions on the describe-a-friend task (Cluster size – 737 contiguous voxels), p 
(uncorrected) = .008 (see Figure 4.2). Extracted contrasts of parameter estimates (COPEs) 
revealed that mean connectivity between the pCC and the fronto-parietal network for 
individuals who demonstrated greater levels of mind-mindedness was significantly lower 
(Mean = -.22, SE = .03) than individuals with lower levels of mind-mindedness (Mean = -.04, 
SE = .03). Further analysis revealed no clusters showing significant connectivity variance in 
the Dorsal Attention Network, p > .05, ns. Also, no significant connectivity variance in the 
Ventral Attention Network was detected, p > .05, ns. No significant connectivity variance 
was detected in the Limbic Network, p > .05, ns. Lastly, no significant connectivity variance 




Figure 4.2. rFMRI Results. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. A: The pCC cluster identified as having significantly decreased connectivity 
with the fronto-parietal network for more mind-minded individuals. B: Group level 
connectivity maps for the unthresholded pCC cluster seeded in the independent dataset of 
140 participants (Nooner et al., 2012). C:Mean connectivity levels for COPEs extracted 
from the pCC cluster shown across lower and higher levels of mind-mindedness. D: A map 
of the fronto-parietal seed network showing decreased connectivity with pCC for more 
mind- minded individuals. 
 
As our mind-mindedness groups were organized into binarised groups, we performed 
a supplementary analysis in which we investigated the extent to which the relation between 
levels of mind-mindedness and fronto-parietal/pCC connectivity levels are continuous. This 
was performed in order to ascertain whether the binarised mental and physical groups 
conveyed an accurate representation of the range of scores on the DAF. We divided the 




displaying quartiles of response ranges, made-up of equal percentiles of responses in each 
group (labelled ‘first quartile’ to ‘fourth quartile’ from lowest-to-highest). A univariate 
ANOVA was performed with extracted COPES from the identified pCC cluster being 
entered as a dependent variable and the mental and physical language quartile groups 
entered as fixed factors. A significant relation was again observed between mind-minded 
descriptions and mean COPE levels, F (3, 142) = 3.86, p = .011 ηp
2 = .075. No significant 
relationship was observed between physical descriptions and mean COPE levels, p > .05, ns. 
No significant interaction effect was observed between mind-minded descriptions, physical 
descriptions, and mean COPE levels, p > .05, ns. Comparison of the first and second 
quartiles of the mind- minded category, t (78) = .046, p = .964, ns, and the third and fourth 
quartiles t (75) = -.236, p = .814, ns, revealed no significant differences (see Figure 4.3). 
This analysis suggests that the relation between levels of mind-mindedness and fronto-
parietal/pCC connectivity levels is not continuous in nature. Given these results it is possible 
to see that DAF scores for mental and physical language use possess a threshold around the 
median range where scores diverge, indicating that our choice to collapse the DAF variables 
into binarised groups did not lead to any misrepresentation or misshaping of the dataset 




Figure 4.3.Connectivity Levels for Extracted COPEs. 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean connectivity levels for COPEs extracted from the pCC cluster shown 
across levels of mind-mindedness spilt into quartiles. 
 
To determine the functional associations of the map linking the pattern of anti- 
correlation between the FPN and the pCC, we performed a formal meta-analytic decoding 
using Neurosynth. A list of most-associated terms was assembled with repetitions and 
references to non-cognitive phenomena removed. The results of this are reflected in the word 
cloud (see Figure 4.4), which indicates that the strongest associations were made between 
terms such as ‘memory’ and ‘social cognition’. This pattern is consistent with the 




Figure 4.4. Neurosynth Meta-Analysis for pCC Cluster. 
 
Figure 4.4. Weighted word cloud of the 20 most commonly associated terms for the pCC 
cluster. Repeated terms and non-cognitive phenomena have been removed. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
The results of the current study demonstrate a pattern of intrinsic brain organisation 
that is associated with mind-mindedness. Participants who spontaneously focus on mental 
and emotional characteristics when describing their close personal friends exhibited stronger 
decoupling between the fronto-parietal network and the medial parietal core of the default 
mode network (DMN) in the posterior cingulate cortex (pCC). The pCC is regarded as a 
central hub that can integrate signals from multiple different regions of cortex, including the 
FPN (Margulies et al., 2016; Leech, Braga, & Sharp, 2012; Miao, Wu, Li, Chen, & Yao, 
2011; Fransson & Marrelec, 2008). Our data suggest that at rest, regions of fronto-parietal 
cortex tend not to be integrated into the DMN for people high on mind-mindedness. 
Our observation suggesting that patterns of pCC integration are important in mind- 
mindedness is consistent with a large literature implicating this and other regions of the DMN 
in social cognition (see for example Schilbach et al., 2008). A key component of social 
cognition is mentalisation, the ability to interpret the mental states of other people (Frith & 
Frith, 2003). A meta-analysis carried-out by Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna and 
Christoff (2015) highlighted several regions of the DMN recruited during tests of individuals’ 




and the angular gyri. Mentalisation serves as a prime example of a social cognitive faculty 
which depends not only on attention to the external world, but a reliance on self-generated 
thought. As individuals cannot directly observe the thoughts of others, mentalisation requires 
the manipulation of internally-represented mental models of other people over time, 
independent of immediate external stimuli (Liberman, 2007). The pCC in particular has 
recently been shown to facilitate the encoding of narratives about complex events into 
memory (Bird et al., 2015), highlighting the importance of the pCC in the creation and 
maintenance of mental models and memories that would be important to understand events. 
Our findings build on these studies by illustrating how individual variation in levels of mind- 
mindedness depends on segregating the DMN connectivity from systems that are naturally 
important in performing complex goal orientated tasks in the here and now (Duncan, 2010). 
Also of interest are our findings indicating that decreased connectivity between the 
FPN and pCC is associated with greater levels of mind-mindedness. Previous studies have 
highlighted the role of independent and interdependent self construals in how we view our 
relational closeness with others (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Individuals with an 
independent self-construal, more prevalent in Western cultures (Markus and Kitayama, 
2010, 1991), perceive that the self is separate from other people. In contrast, individuals with 
an interdependent self-construal, which is more prevalent in East Asian cultures (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991, 2010), perceive that the self is connected with significant others. The FPN, 
and specifically its relationship to the DMN, has been observed to be influential in 
processing information related to an independent self construal. Research conducted by Li et 
al. (2018) showed that decreased connectivity between the FPN and the DMN is associated 
with the processing of interdependent self construals, emphasising the closeness of 
relationships with others. Therefore, as mind-mindedness appears to arise as a quality of 
close relationships (Meins, Fernyhough and Harris-Waller, 2014) it is feasible that the 




mindedness is at least in part due to the nature of mind-mindedness as processing 
information about others with whom we have close relationships. 
Further research also links mPFC functioning with the wider DMN in order to 
produce multiple facets of social cognition. Li, Mai and Liu (2014) have demonstrated that 
the mPFC plays a key role in the social understanding of others, with sub-regions of the 
mPFC contributing differently to social-cognitive processing according to their role in 
different sub-systems of the DMN. The ventral mPFC connects with limbic and emotional 
processing regions, and assists with emotional engagement during social interactions. The 
anterior mPFC extends connections into posterior and anterior cingulate cortex architecture 
and is associated with self-other distinction. The dorsal mPFC has been shown to connect 
with the TPJ, primarily being associated with the understanding of the mental states of 
others. Li et al. (2014) suggest that this reflects the transfer of information processing from 
automatic or implicit cognitive processes to explicit cognitive processes, with social 
interactions of increased complexity. 
A meta-analysis conducted by Mar (2011) has implicated a ‘mentalising network’ 
composed of the mPFC, pCC and bilateral TPJ in the encoding of the perspectives of other 
people when processing the narratives of stories. When considered alongside the findings of 
Bird et al. (2015), observing the role of the pCC in the encoding of narratives for complex 
event sequences, evidence suggests that the relationship between the mPFC and pCC appears 
to function as a major channel of information processing for the complex and dynamic event 
sequences experienced during social interactions. Altogether, these results indicate the 
importance of variance in connectivity levels between multiple sub-regions of the mPFC and 
various hubs of DMN connectivity in social-cognitive processing, and accords with the 
findings of the present study by providing further evidence for the mPFC and pCC as key 
contributors towards mind-mindedness. 




that the observed decoupling of the pCC from the FPN that is heightened in highly mind- 
minded individuals reflects the role that memory processes play in spontaneous forms of 
social cognition. The ability to make sense of another person’s behaviour depends crucially 
on the capacity to place their behaviour in the appropriate context, and this in turn depends on 
our prior experience of the individual. As noted previously, research has shown that pCC- 
FPN decoupling is characteristic of the mind-wandering state (Raichle et al., 2001) in which 
social cognitive processes and thoughts about our experiences with other people play a 
prominent role (Engert et al., 2014). Our study suggests that mind-minded individuals show 
greater levels of this decoupling at rest. In this way, our study provides novel neurocognitive 
evidence that mind-mindedness, and likely other aspects of social cognition, is supported by 
memories of previous experiences and interactions we have gained through our lives. 
Consistent with this view, the DMN has been linked to both the engagement of 
semantic memory (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009) and episodic memory (Vilburg 
and Rugg, 2012), and so it is an open question whether the pattern of neural organization we 
observed in our experiment reflects the role of general social knowledge, or episodic 
knowledge of specific individuals. In either case, our data suggest that memory plays an 
important role in mind-mindedness, and that this is likely to be supported by functional 
segregation between the DMN and the FPN. We speculate that this may correspond to a 
pattern of cognition in which memories regarding personally familiar individuals are 
activated in an automatic manner, a mechanism which could explain the spontaneous manner 
with which individuals high on mind-mindedness retrieve information about their friends. 
4.5. Conclusions 
In closing, it is worth considering the possibility that the pattern of connectivity we 
observe reflects the thoughts that participants experienced at rest. Recent work investigating 
the content of thoughts experienced in the resting state highlights the fact that a significant 




Smallwood et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 2013), suggesting that a consistent proportion of the 
thoughts that occupy our minds during the resting state may reflect a form of social cognition. 
Moreover, individuals who experience a greater prevalence of spontaneous social thoughts 
have been shown to exhibit greater proficiency at generating solutions to social problems 
(Ruby et al, 2013). Consistent with this view, prior studies have shown that the same region 
of pCC as we identified was linked to mind mindedness is more connected to regions in the 
temporal lobe at rest for participants who engage in high levels of spontaneous thoughts 
regarding other people, places, and times (Smallwood et al., 2016). Together, these lines of 
converging evidence suggest that one reason why we see a pattern of functional decoupling 
between the posterior cingulate cortex and the FPN at rest may be because this pattern of 
neural activity is linked to the expression of particular types of socially guided thoughts at 







The experiments conducted during the course of this research revealed both 
constituent cognitive processes relating to mind-mindedness and the underlying neural 
processes involved associated with it as a form of higher-order cognition. Regarding the 
behavioural work conducted in Studies 1 and 2, the overall goal of this thesis was to create a 
battery of measures that captured variance in some cognitive process related to mind- 
mindedness, as a correlate or component process. This was performed with an end goal of 
triangulating and identifying sub-processes enabling and contributing towards some part of 
mind-mindedness. Regarding the neuroimaging work conducted in Study 3, the major aim 
was to utilise resting-state fMRI (rfMRI) to provide insight into the large-scale connectivity 
networks that constitute mind-mindedness. Together, the experiments performed in Studies 1 
and 2 aimed to capture various aspects of cognition that might be involved with mind- 
mindedness, social interaction and memory, and to use this knowledge to guide our 
subsequent search for the neural correlates of mind-mindedness. The end goal of this aim was 
to explore whether it was possible to produce a component-process model of mind- 
mindedness that incorporates both psychological and neural processes. 
Initial findings from Study 1 revealed a link between mind mindedness and increased 
rates of memory recall for narratives containing social information. This trend was present 
when participants were denied the opportunity for mental rehearsal of the narratives 
contained in the video clips. These findings suggest that mind-mindedness is dependent upon 
a capacity for the effective encoding and retrieval of event sequences in memory. 
Accordingly, Study 1 addresses and fulfils the first major goal of the thesis by identifying a 
link between memory and mind-mindedness. 




variety of clinical and questionnaire measures, and also examined the relationship between 
mind-mindedness and recognition memory for associations made between two referents (Self 
and Lady Gaga) and a control condition (Syllables) of the SRT respectively (de Caso et al., 
2017). Study 2 worked to further elaborate upon the link between mind-mindedness and 
memory for social information previously established in Study 1. The primary aim of Study 2 
was to ascertain whether mind-mindedness is linked specifically with episodic memories and 
knowledge about a person based on personal interactions, allowing for the utilisation of this 
information to inform the subsequent search for the neural correlates of mind-mindedness. 
The retrieval of this information allowed for an informed interpretation of neuroimaging 
results regarding areas revealed that might demonstrate common functional overlap between 
mind-mindedness, memory processes or other revealed behavioural correlates of the 
construct. 
Study 2 revealed a link between mind-mindedness, heightened levels of rumination 
and daydreaming, and provided further evidence for the relational nature of mind-
mindedness through demonstrating the absence of a relationship between mind-mindedness 
and descriptions of personally unknown others (Lady Gaga). The findings of Study 2 address 
the first goal of this thesis by demonstrating a behavioural link between rumination (a 
process associated with past-oriented thinking) and mind-mindedness and also demonstrating 
a connection between mind-mindedness and episodic memory. These findings suggest that 
episodic memory, as a processing stream for the encoding, storage and recall of scenes and 
events, is an important component of mind-mindedness. This association provides evidence 
that mind-mindedness may possess some common functional architecture with episodic 
memory processes in the brain. 
Lastly, Study 3 sought to utilise fMRI methods to directly compare levels of mind- 
mindedness against variance in large-scale network connectivity in the resting brain with a 




mindedness within individuals on a neural level. Study 3 revealed increased negative 
connectivity between the pCC and the FPN in the resting brain for individuals scoring higher 
in mind-mindedness. The pCC is often associated with both the emergence of spontaneous 
thought (Poerio et al., 2017) and the encoding of event sequences to memory (Bird et al., 
2015). Therefore, finding that this area holds a connection with mind-mindedness fulfils the 
ambition of this thesis to provide evidence for components of mind-mindedness on both a 
behavioural and neural level by identifying common neural networks involved with the 
production of both a theorised component of mind-mindedness (episodic memory) and mind- 
mindedness itself. Study 3 fulfils the second major aim of this thesis directly by evidencing 
for the first time a large-scale functional connectivity pattern in the brain associated with 
levels of mind-mindedness within the individual. 
5.2. Findings from Study 1 
The results of Study 1 revealed a link between our social relationships with others and 
how we encode and retrieve information from memory. Interestingly, the link between mind- 
mindedness and memory established by the results of Study 1 appears to emphasise the 
encoding of social information into memory when forming narrative sequences about events. 
Although individuals scoring lower in mind-mindedness received an expected benefit to 
video clip recall, individuals more inclined to describe their friends in terms of mental 
characteristics demonstrated an overall benefit in recalling clips portraying human social 
interactions when no opportunity for rehearsal was granted. More mind-minded individuals 
therefore appear to be naturally adept at encoding the narrative structure of social interactions 
into memory.  
These findings also demonstrate that mind-minded individuals appear to possess an 
implicit bias towards focusing on socially-relevant information when forming narratives 
about events. Participants who scored higher for mental language use of the DAF task 




which was subsequently more readily available for retrieval in the absence of any 
opportunity for mental rehearsal of the information. This evidence suggests that mind-
mindedness may arise from automatic learned responses, allowing spontaneous focus on 
social contexts and signals to influence the manner in which narratives are stored in memory 
(Amodio & Ratner, 2011). This type of implicit learning experienced during social 
interactions may in part explain why mind-minded individuals demonstrate an unconscious 
bias towards focus on mental states when interpreting the behaviour of other people. 
Seen in this light, greater level of attention given to mental characteristics during the 
DAF task arguably provides a more readily available series of schemata (DiMaggio, 1997) 
for interpreting social phenomena and incorporating this information into memory. Bird et al. 
(2015) observed that the mental rehearsal of complex event sequences recruits the posterior 
cingulate cortex to assist in the consolidation of a narrative structure for those event 
sequences in memory. The posterior cingulate cortex therefore maintains a strong functional 
connection to the hippocampus and has also been observed to share a large amount of 
functional network with areas commonly recruited in measures of social cognitive ability, 
including the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporo-parietal junction (Frith, 2007). For 
more mind-minded individuals, the posterior cingulate may serve as a gatekeeper regulating 
the processing of information between these brain regions, allowing for a focus on 
social/mental information as the notable events transferred into memory. A neural network 
with such an arrangement would explain the link between heightened emphasis on mental 
qualities in a narrative produced about another person during the DAF task, fixation on 
social/mental cues and a subsequent benefit to recall even with limited opportunity for 
mental rehearsal. 
Also noteworthy was our initial finding that individuals who scored higher in terms of 
their use of physical language when describing their friends during the DAF task had an 




observed that recognition memory for objects facilitates the encoding of events into long- 
term memory stores through allowing the integration of location and recency information 
(Barker, Bird, Alexander, & Warburton, 2007). Keogh and Pearson (2011) have also shown 
that stronger mental imagery results in a more effective visual working memory. 
Accordingly, it may be the case that a tendency to fixate on the physical or visual features of 
a target as reflected by higher scores for physical language use on the DAF assisted 
recognition for human clips compared to animal clips due to the former possessing a greater 
number of recognisable objects such as clothing, furniture and props. Together, the findings 
of Study 1 highlight the importance of disparate cognitive processes, including memory and 
attention, working together in concert as common components producing the higher-order 
function of mind-mindedness necessary for the processing of complex social event-
sequences. 
5.3. Findings from Study 2 
Having established a relation between functional memory systems and mind- 
mindedness in the first study, Study 2 further elaborates upon these findings by allowing us to 
investigate the relations between mind-mindedness and recognition memory for terms 
associated with either ‘self’ or ‘others’ in order to investigate whether  the expression of 
mind-mindedness may be generalised to include all ‘others’, both known and unknown, or 
whether it is dependent on closer relationships with known others in a manner proposed by 
Meins, Fernyhough and Harris-Waller, 2014). High levels of mind- mindedness were not 
associated with better recognition for targets encoded with reference to Lady Gaga. Also, no 
relationship was observed between mind-mindedness and memory for information that was 
encoded explicitly (in the paired associates task), or associated with the self, or through its 
phonological structure. Combining these findings with the previous study performed, 
showing a link between higher mind-mindedness and increased rates for the correct 




mindedness consists in part of an increased tendency to encode socially-relevant information 
into long-term episodic memory, and to then drawn-upon it at a later point in time when 
forming narratives about the mental states and processes of others (Lieberman, 2007). Also, 
evidence suggests that individuals are also more likely to draw-upon these stored 
representations of the mental states of others when trying to form narratives or interpret the 
behaviour of close others, with whom we have commonly interacted, in a manner similar to 
that proposed by Meins et al. (2014). 
The evidence gathered suggesting that mind-mindedness is partly dependent on 
episodic memories of shared interactions with another individual and does not constitute a 
general trait-like tendency to assign mental states to others, further suggests that the quality 
of the closeness of relationships allows for the emergence of mind-minded thought and 
behaviour. Heerey and Velani (2010) have shown that the level of personal liking held for 
another individual is predictive of the ability to understand their behaviour using nonverbal 
social cues. Hudson, Nijboer and Jellema (2012) have further provided evidence that positive 
social interactions facilitate the process of implicit social learning, and subsequently allow 
for greater proficiency in predicting the behaviour of other people. Accordingly, close 
interpersonal relationships may provide an ideal setting in which mind-mindedness may 
develop, arising as a spontaneous tendency to mentalise during social interactions or when 
thinking about close others. 
Furthermore, findings from Study 2 show an association between mind- mindedness 
and measures of wellbeing; the tendency to ruminate and daydreaming frequency. 
Rumination, as a process involving recurring involuntary or spontaneous fixation on 
memories of past experiences (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013), being associated with 
higher levels of mind-mindedness provides further evidence of a link between mind-
mindedness, memory processes and spontaneous thought processes. Research also 




reference to social factors and other people (Ruby et al., 2013; Engert et al., 2014), 
consistent with the finding of Study 2 that daydreaming or mind-wandering is associated 
with increased tendency to spontaneous mentalise on the DAF task. The findings of this 
section of analyses for Study 2 together provide evidence for a link between mind-
mindedness and increased tendency to engage in mind-wandering or spontaneous thought 
processes. 
Together these results suggest that mind-mindedness is dependent upon a dynamic 
network of spontaneous thought and memory processes and that this form of applied social 
cognition is related to measurable outcomes of cognitive behaviour with real consequences 
for our socio-developmental trajectory. The finding of a link between greater levels of mind- 
mindedness on the DAF task and higher scores for rumination on the ruminative responses 
scale (RRS) elucidates the essential nature of mind-mindedness as a sophisticated social 
problem-solving process. Rumination is classified as a form of spontaneous thought- 
processing involving repeated attention being directed to the achievement of goals (Watkins, 
2008). Although rumination is often considered a maladaptive tendency, associated with 
negative outcomes, Ciarocco, Vohs, and Baumeister (2010) have observed that the 
experience of rumination can lead to beneficial ends and may serve, in certain contexts, an 
adaptive purpose. They found that task-focused thinking after a perceived failure (ruminating 
about a negative experience in social interaction, for example) facilitates later task 
performance. Observed in this light, rumination serves as a spontaneous method of rehearsal 
about the negative aspects of a memory in order to avoid similar circumstances. (Kuo et al., 
2012) have shown that rumination facilitates the encoding of negative experiences to 
memory, demonstrating the role of ruminative thought-processes in placing a particular 
emphasis on the manner in which events are segmented into memory in a manner similar to 
mind-mindedness. Mind-mindedness operates as a spontaneous form of social cognition 




upon previous interactions held with them (Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2001). 
The previous findings of Study 1 also reveal the role of mind-mindedness in encoding 
social events to memory. Both mind-mindedness and rumination therefore appear to possess 
many common features in the manner in which they process information in the brain, 
however they serve to facilitate social relationships and task/goal-oriented behaviour 
respectively. Interestingly, although mind-mindedness is often treated as a universal positive 
in understanding the aims and intentions of others, having access to knowledge about the 
internal states of others brings with it not only predictive ability in social scenarios, but also 
an internalised knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of those we care about. Seeing that 
mind-minded individuals possess an increased tendency to ruminate suggests that access to 
this information about mental states, while beneficial in cementing social relationships, may 
bring with it greater attention to subtle social cues and accordingly, greater volumes of 
potential fuel for rumination when social interactions may not always be positive in nature. 
Although higher scores for mind-mindedness are generally considered positive, it may be 
possible that certain high levels of mind-mindedness are more pathological. Investigating in 
greater detail the actual content of mind-minded descriptions on the DAF task to establish 
whether they appear to portray social anxiety, paranoia, or other potentially pathological 
features may be an interesting avenue for future research. 
5.4. Findings from Study 3 
The results of Study 3 provide us for the first time with a perspective of the 
functioning of the neural networks underlying mind-mindedness on an individual basis, as 
informed by the resting-state neuroimaging data gathered and compared against variance in 
propensity towards spontaneous mental language use. A stronger negative correlation was 
observed between the fronto-parietal network (FPN) and the medial-parietal core of the 
default-mode network, the posterior cingulate cortex (pCC), associated with higher scores for 




crucial to the tasks of attention and memory, and therefore are recruited in a variety of 
contexts including social cognition. The nature of the relationship between the FPN and pCC 
as exhibiting a greater level of resting ‘disconnection’ for mind-minded individuals also 
describes an interesting picture of mind-mindedness and how its underlying neuro-functional 
make-up reflects aspects of the typical resting brain. 
The FPN forms a network involved in the selection of sensory contents and 
attenuation towards relevant environmental stimuli (Ptak, 2012). Regions of the dorsal 
frontoparietal network have also been proposed to engage in a variety of roles involving 
working memory and related mental processes, such as spatial attention and motor planning 
(Ptak, Schnider, & Fellrath, 2017). Although mind-mindedness entails the processing of 
abstract mental states and has no direct relation to concepts such as spatial awareness and 
other such kinematic phenomena, the ability to shift attention towards external stimuli, such 
as social cues and expressions, plays a fundamental role in constituting the ability to attenuate 
towards the mental states of others. Attentional control and direction coordinated by 
frontoparietal network activity therefore serves as a necessary precondition for effective 
mind-mindedness. Likewise, the pCC is implicated in facilitating aspects of cognition 
pertinent as necessary components of mind-mindedness. The pCC is regarded as a central 
hub integrating signals from multiple different regions of cortex, including the FPN 
(Margulies et al., 2016; Leech, et al., 2012; Miao, Wu, Li, Chen, & Yao, 2011; Fransson & 
Marrelec, 2008). The pCC also serves as the central processor for the default mode network, 
a brain network spanning a great deal of neural architecture involved in mentalisation (Fox et 
al., 2015), another essential cognitive subcomponent of mind-mindedness providing the 
ability to access encoded information about the mental states of other people across time 
(Liberman, 2007). The pCC itself has been shown to facilitate the encoding of narratives 
about complex events such as social interactions into memory (Bird et al., 2015), highlighting 




recruited during mentalisation as part of the application of mind-mindedness on the DAF 
task. Findings from the meta-analytic decoding performed by entering the revealed pCC 
cluster into Neurosynth (Yarkoni et al., 2011) to search for associated terms was also 
revealing of the link between the pCC and memory for social information. A list of most-
associated terms was assembled with repetitions and references to non-cognitive phenomena 
removed, indicating that the strongest associations were made between terms such as 
‘memory’ and ‘social cognition’. These findings support the view that social and memory 
processes are important aspects of mind-mindedness. 
Interestingly, the pattern of neuroimaging results obtained for more mind-minded 
individuals in the third study presents an exaggerated form of the connectivity relations 
observed between the DMN and the FPN in the resting brain. Previous studies have 
suggested that competitive relationships between the DMN and the FPN are intrinsically 
represented in the brain in the form of strong anti-correlations between spontaneous 
fluctuations in these networks (Uddin, Kelley, Biswal, Castellanos, & Milham, 2009) in a 
state known as ‘perceptual decoupling’ (Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, Reichle, & 
Sayette, 2011). This relationship is typical of the resting-state of the brain, when no focus or 
engagement is given to an external task. The DMN, with central hubs such as the pCC 
exhibiting heightened activity during rest (Luo, Kong, Qi, You, & Huang, 2015), possesses 
functional overlap with many of the brain regions involved in social cognition (Mars et al., 
2012). Social-cognitive problem-solving involving thinking about others, past interactions 
and future predictions have also been suggested to consist of a large part of the processing 
performed during the resting state (Schilbach et al., 2008). Recent research demonstrates 
that experiences of mind-wandering during the resting state often involve thoughts about the 
past and other people (Ruby et al., 2013; Engert et al., 2014), consistent with the view that 
social cognition is a major component of the thought processes performed during the resting 




individuals scoring higher for mind-mindedness display an exaggerated form of this resting-
state network connectivity, with a stronger anti-correlation between the pCC and FPN 
during states of rest. Given that in general this perceptual decoupling arising from 
interaction between the DMN and FPN is associated with a greater frequency of 
spontaneously-experienced social thinking, it is entirely plausible that the stronger levels of 
anti-correlation between the FPN and pCC observed in mind-minded individuals represent a 
greater general flexibility in attending to non-immediate information. This non-immediate 
information consisting of, in the case of mind-mindedness, episodic memories of others 
assisting in the formation of narratives about the social events around them and mental 
models of the social agents encountered. 
5.5. Limitations 
It is appropriate to acknowledge some of the methodological limitations of the studies 
performed and discuss how these limitations informed the structure and design of each 
subsequent experiment and the bearing they have on the interpretation of the experimental 
results gathered. One example of this would be the choice to split our continuous variables 
from the DAF task into binarised groups of ‘high’ and ‘low’ scores for both mental language 
and physical language categories. In undertaking this approach, the decision was made to 
simplify the dataset in collapsing the variables in order to explore mind-mindedness in a 
more in-depth manner and analyse results in line with a comparison of means. Mind-
mindedness, as a form of higher-order cognition, is a complex construct with multiple 
contributing lower- order components. Accordingly, by fitting our mental language and 
physical language variables to median-split groups, we gained the ability to compare means 
across mental and physical language groups by performing analysis of variance enabling us 
to see potential interaction effects. One example of where this approach was deemed 
necessary was with our initial experiment, concerned with the link between mind-




experiment could be modulated by memory for objects, or other physical or non-social 
information. Being able to observe any potential interaction between mental and physical 
language groups in response to experimental conditions was therefore deemed appropriate at 
the expense of possessing continuous data. 
As a sanity-check, during Study 3 we performed a supplementary analysis in which 
we investigated the extent to which the relation between levels of mind-mindedness and 
fronto-parietal/pCC connectivity levels were continuous. The describe-a-friend mind-minded 
and physical description categories were separated into four groups each, displaying quartiles 
of response ranges, made-up of equal percentiles of responses in each group (labelled ‘first 
quartile’ to ‘fourth quartile’ from lowest-to-highest). A univariate ANOVA was performed 
with extracted COPES from the identified pCC cluster being entered as a dependent variable 
and the mental and physical language quartile groups entered as fixed factors. Comparison of 
the first and second quartiles of the mind-minded category and the third and fourth quartiles 
revealed no significant differences. This suggests that the relation between levels of mind- 
mindedness and fronto-parietal/pCC connectivity levels are not continuous in nature, instead 
possessing a threshold around the median range where scores diverge, indicating that our 
choice to collapse the DAF variables into binarised groups did not lead to any significant 
data-loss or misrepresentation caused by this treatment of the dataset. For all other intents 
and purposes, correlation analyses were included where appropriate across all three 
experiments where the continuous nature of the DAF variables was retained. 
As mentioned previously, Study 1 carried with it the possibility that memory for 
social clips shown in the experiment could be modulated by memory for objects, or other 
physical or non-social information. The term ‘recognition memory’ has been adopted to 
describe the occurrence of memory recall facilitated by familiar objects (Barker et al., 2007). 
The more familiar an object is to an individual, or the more an individual has previous 




involving these objects (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). Therefore, the possibility that the video 
clips containing human interactions would better facilitate recognition due to their containing 
various familiar objects such as furniture, props and clothing was noted. However, as 
discussed previously in the chapter outlining Study 1, results suggest that it may be 
reasonably inferred that mind- minded individuals possessed an enhanced capacity for 
encoding the social information displayed in the human video clips, rather than being 
influenced by the physical objects displayed. As stated previously, mind-mindedness is a 
tendency towards focus on mental states (Meins, 1997). Accordingly, when considering the 
finding that heightened mental state language use was related to better proficiency in 
memory for clips portraying human interactions, along with the relative ‘richness’ of 
relatable social interactions contained in the human video clips compared to the animal clips, 
evidence suggests this is the case. 
Study 2 was primarily concerned with triangulating what types of memory 
associations might be related to mind-mindedness and delving deeper into the memory 
component aspect of the construct. As such, where the first experiment focuses on analysing 
forms of episodic memory and event segmentation, the follow-up study also aimed to add a 
further level of investigation in which a comparison with variance in levels of mind-
mindedness with proficiency in recognition memory across a relational gradient on the SRT 
in a manner similar to that explored by Meins et al. (2014). One notable issue with the use of 
the Self-reference task however, is that the same conditions of ‘best friend’, ‘famous figure’ 
and ‘work of art’ are not explored. Therefore, although it is possible to make comparisons 
between the ‘Lady Gaga’ and ‘famous figure’ conditions of the present study and the study 
conducted by Meins et al. (2014) respectively, the present does not capitalise on exploring the 
relational nature of mind-mindedness in a manner that allows for direct comparison along 
multiple stages of this relational gradient. Meins et al. (2014) pointed-out that levels of mind-




individuals. Accordingly, adults are most likely to focus on mental characteristics with 
individuals they have a close personal relationship with and therefore the use of a famous 
figure instead may limit the degree to which individuals demonstrate mind- mindedness. 
Accordingly, future research conducted in this area would ideally further adapt the SRT, 
potentially also including a condition where associations pertaining to a ‘Best Friend’ were 
encoded, along with the three Self, Lady Gaga and Syllables conditions. In this way, a more 
direct parallel would be achieved with the study performed by Meins et al. (2014) and the 
extent to which mind-mindedness related to memory across all stages of self, a personally-
known other, a famous figure and control condition could be assessed. Such a design could 
further explore the relational nature of mind-mindedness, potentially revealing any effects of 
mind-mindedness for recognition memory when a personally-known other is utilised as a 
referent. 
A final point to mention here with regard to potential limitations concerns the nature 
of the neuroimaging study performed. Namely, the use of resting-state fMRI techniques 
provides a degree of cost weighted against benefit in that this approach does not subscribe to 
a task-based paradigm. A limitation brought with this approach consists of an inability to 
directly compare levels of mind-mindedness with associated neural activations in response to 
a specific task or condition. With regard to results gathered from the previous behavioural 
studies performed, this results in an inability to directly compare variance in mind- 
mindedness and changes in levels of neural activation with the recruitment of episodic 
memory processes during a task-based experimental paradigm. However, two pertinent 
aspects of mind-mindedness make resting-state fMRI a desirable and appropriate approach to 
take when investigating the neural components of the construct: the relative complexity of 
mind-mindedness as a form of higher-order cognition and the spontaneous or non-volitional 
nature of mind-mindedness as it is naturally employed. As previously mentioned mind- 




and disparate array of brain regions serving as functional subcomponents (Spreng, 2013; 
Mars et al., 2012). Rather than applying focus on changes in levels of neural activation in a 
number of isolate brain regions in response to task conditions, resting-state fMRI therefore 
proves a desirable approach in that changes in connectivity levels across complex networks 
spanning the entirety of the cortex may be directly compared and contrasted with variance in 
levels of mind-mindedness. 
The nature of mind-mindedness as a spontaneous form of social cognition also makes 
resting-state fMRI a desirable approach to take when investigating neural activity associated 
with the construct as any task-based paradigm employed here would not effectively replicate 
the circumstances in which mind-mindedness is employed. Spreng (2013) discusses how a 
number of social-cognitive calculations are spontaneously performed in the resting brain, 
during states of mind-wandering or with no explicit task instructions to follow. Mind- 
mindedness fits neatly into this category of spontaneous social cognition, being characterised 
as a focus on mental states without any explicit requirement or instruction to do so. In order 
to investigate how mind-mindedness utilises these brain networks commonly associated with 
spontaneous cognition it is therefore appropriate to investigate its neural components in a 
manner requiring no explicit task, such as resting-state fMRI. Accordingly, although this 
approach does not enable us to directly compare mind-mindedness against variance in brain 
activity in response to changing task conditions (such as a test of working memory) it does 
allow us to more authentically replicate the neural processes involved in spontaneous social 
cognition. 
Although adopting this approach means that no direct comparison with memory 
processes may be drawn if the results of the neuroimaging study are considered in isolation, 
we are able to reasonably infer that the neural components of episodic memory are recruited 
as components of mind-mindedness through evidence gathered from previous work 




behavioural studies performed). Previous work highlighting the role of the observed 
significant cluster, the posterior cingulate cortex, in encoding complex event narratives such 
as social interactions into memory (Bird et al., 2015) also provides strong evidence of a link 
with memory. Furthermore, the sanity check performed using Neurosynth also strongly 
associates the posterior cingulate with episodic memory, overall allowing for a rational 
assertion of this region observed as being involved in the functional make-up of mind- 
mindedness with memory processes. In order to further investigate the link between mind- 
mindedness, the pCC and episodic memory, task-based fMRI paradigms further assessing 
this link may prove a beneficial avenue for future research. 
5.6. Interpretation of Findings 
Taken together, the results of our inquiries into the neural correlates of mind- 
mindedness provide evidence that mind-mindedness is linked to the way other people are 
represented in episodic memory, and the extent to which those representations facilitate 
mind-mindedness is moderated according to the closeness of a relationship. Furthermore, 
mind-minded individuals possess a stronger than average anti-correlation of functional 
connectivity between the frontoparietal network and posterior cingulate cortex in the resting 
brain; a pattern of connectivity associated with engagement of the pCC in tasks related to 
working memory recall (Piccoli et al., 2015). The results gathered collectively demonstrate 
the associations between mind-mindedness, spontaneous thought and social cognition at a 
neural and functional level. 
The state of mind-wandering or spontaneous thought, where attention is diverted 
towards internally-generated stimuli, is characterised by the emergence of the default mode 
network, with the pCC acting as a central hub (Mason et al., 2007). Both social cognition (in 
the form of thoughts about other people) and thinking about the past form a consistent 
component of thoughts experienced during the mind-wandering state (Ruby et al., 2013; 




encoding of complex event narratives into long-term memory (Bird et al., 2015) can therefore 
be proposed to serve as a processing gate abstracted away from immediate memory or 
‘default mode’ networks allowing communication between these two areas of processing, that 
results in the heightened saliency of socially-relevant information in the mind-wandering 
state. Interestingly, the fact that the behavioural studies performed point out two features of 
cognition common to mind-minded individuals, greater efficacy at encoding social 
information in memory and also a greater propensity towards rumination—links the 
functioning of the construct to the wider neural foundations for social cognition, memory and 
spontaneous thought in general. Therefore as rumination serves as an example of past- 
oriented spontaneous thought (Poerio et al., 2013), which is often associated with a critical 
appraisal of one’s social performance (Zou & Abbott, 2012), it is likely that it shares a 
considerable degree of overlap in neural circuitry with mind-mindedness. Individuals who are 
more intuitively aware of subtle social cues and the intentions of others have access to a 
richer variety of social information which they may use to assess their past actions in social 
scenarios. Therefore, although mind-mindedness serves to facilitate social interactions by 
providing a trove of social knowledge with which to contextualise an event, in sharing many 
neural and behavioural commonalities with rumination, it appears that the outcomes for a 
mind-minded individual may also bring a risk of fixation on negative social experiences and 
an increased tendency to ruminate about past interactions. 
Crucially, in exploring the components of mind-mindedness, the neuroimaging results 
show that mind-minded individuals possess a stronger anti-correlation of functional 
connectivity between the posterior cingulate cortex and the frontoparietal network in the 
resting brain. This pattern of connectivity is often associated with a load-dependent cognitive 
processing (Raichle, 2015; Gao & Lin. 2012). Recent work has demonstrated anti-correlation 
between the pCC and frontoparietal network when engaged in tasks requiring the 




opinion in the field is that the default mode network communicates with working memory 
systems via the posterior cingulate’s anti-correlation with parietal and prefrontal brain regions 
in situations requiring access to stimulus-independent thought, such as episodic memories of 
past interactions, allowing a state of perceptual decoupling (Schooler et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, Poerio et al. (2017) have pointed out the functional heterogeneity of the DMN 
and its comprising regions engaged in memory and social planning, suggesting that the wider 
role of this state of DMN-frontoparietal decoupling is to allow memory representations of 
previous episodes to become salient and inform conscious experiences and decisions. 
Mitchell, Macrae and Banaji (2004) have previously suggested that information from 
long-term episodic memory stores is integrated into working memory in order to assist in 
the interpretation of social contexts. The evidence gathered so far appears to suggest that 
mind-minded individuals are more inclined to encode social information into memory and 
this may therefore partially account for the increased tendency for individuals to 
spontaneously utilise more mental state language and assign social and emotional contexts 
to behaviours. Amodio and Ratner (2011) have also suggested that processes of implicit 
learning and memory systems interact during social interactions in a manner allowing for 
the automatic retrieval of previous similar experiences stored in episodic memory in 
response to certain social cues and contexts. Accordingly, it may be that processes of 
implicit social learning contribute towards the spontaneous nature of mind-mindedness by 
encouraging focus on mental states and their implied social consequences, this being 
accomplished in a manner outside the conscious awareness of individuals. 
Such a viewpoint would attest to the relational nature of mind-mindedness by 
suggesting that the decoupled state allows us to attend to memories of previous social 
interactions with an individual in order to better facilitate a current interaction. Such a 
cognitive process would prove invaluable in maintaining long-term close relationships that 




behavioural connection between mind-mindedness and memory for socially-relevant 
information, and neuroimaging evidence linking greater levels of mind-mindedness to 
exaggerated pCC-frontoparietal decoupling, the neural components of mind-mindedness 
appear to reside in large part with the role of the pCC in encoding events into long-term 
memory (Bird et al., 2015). Also, the wider role of the pCC as a hub of the DMN appears to 
contribute towards the production of mind-mindedness through the regulation of its 
connectivity with the frontoparietal network—modulating the propensity for social-
cognition and socially-relevant memories to spontaneously occur. 
5.7. Conclusions 
Over the course of the studies performed, a clear picture has begun to emerge about 
the cognitive subcomponents associated with mind-mindedness as a form of complex 
higher- order cognition. Among these components, the results gathered have continually 
pointed-out an effective episodic memory as an important correlate of mind-mindedness. 
Alongside a propensity for describing events in terms of their social or mental dynamics, 
mind-minded individuals have been shown to possess an advantage at encoding events 
containing human interactions to memory even without the opportunity for mental rehearsal, 
suggesting that they are intuitively encoding event-sequences in terms of the social 
information contained therein. Amodio and Ratner (2011) have suggested that implicitly 
learned associations we form during social interactions can subsequently influence the 
memories we form about events. It is possible that in such a way mind-minded individuals 
develop or implicitly acquire a tendency to automatically focus on the mental states of 
others when encoding to memory the complex event sequences experienced during social 
interactions. 
In terms of the neuroimaging data gathered, an arrangement of resting-state 
connectivity consisting of stronger anti-correlation between the prefrontal cortex and 




connectivity is typical of states of perceptual decoupling, where episodic memories of past 
events and social calculations constitute a major proportion of the mental processing 
performed. Accordingly, this stronger level of anti-correlation between the frontoparietal 
network and the posterior cingulate observed in mind-minded individuals may explain the 
increased tendency for mind-minded individuals to spontaneously represent interactions with 
others in terms of their social dynamics. Such a neural configuration may allow for a greater 
degree of flexibility in attending to information not bound to the present moment, such as 
memories of past interactions with others, in order to help make sense of complex and 
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